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ABSTRACT
SIR ROBERT THOMPSON’S BETTER WAR: THE BRITISH ADVISORY MISSION
AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, 1961-1963
by Richard Lovering
May 2017
This thesis examines the interactions between the British Advisory Mission to
South Vietnam (BRIAM) and the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem and
his American advisors. By studying BRIAM’s efforts—and those of its leader, Sir
Robert Thompson—this thesis argues that many of the tactics Thompson advocated and
Diem executed, especially the Strategic Hamlet Program, foreshadowed the techniques
Americans used several years later under General Creighton Abrams, during the period
historian Lewis Sorley termed the “better war.”
Sorley argued that the American strategy in the Vietnam War was flawed until
Abrams implemented his “one war” plan. With this interpretation, however, he ignored
the earlier attempts by BRIAM, Diem, and many of the American advisors to win the war
using South Vietnamese forces. Long before the introduction of US combat units into the
conflict, the efforts of BRIAM and American advisors to work through the government of
South Vietnam mirrored President Richard Nixon and Abrams’s later Vietnamization
policy.
Drawing from the files of the Foreign Relations of the United States, military
documents located in the US National Archives, and BRIAM’s records in the British
National Archives, this thesis maintains that Abrams’s “one war” plan was not a unique,
“better war” approach. Thompson and Diem pursued a similar strategy in the early
ii

1960s, and it was Diem’s death in the American-backed coup of November 1963 that
ended these original efforts at waging a better war in South Vietnam.

iii
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
The United States wanted a better war in Vietnam. From 1965 until 1973, this
desire led to a steady increase—and then a steady decrease—in the number of American
soldiers and marines engaged in combat operations in the jungles, mountains, and deltas
of South Vietnam. In 1968, General Creighton Abrams replaced General William
Westmoreland, and ‘search and destroy’ gave way to ‘one war’. However, despite
Abrams’s (arguably) new emphasis on pacification and winning Vietnamese hearts and
minds, public opinion in the United States had long since decided the war was lost, and
combat troops were duly withdrawn in 1973. Moreover, without American support,
Saigon fell in 1975 to the armored columns of the communist People’s Army of Vietnam.
Abrams’s efforts are the subject of Lewis Sorley’s A Better War, in which Sorley
maintained that Abrams’s emphasis on training the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (or
ARVN) and securing the local Vietnamese population led to tactical success against
communist forces during the last years of US involvement.1 He believed Abrams’s
programs represented a new strategy (which resulted in a ‘better war’), and Sorley
contrasted the Abrams period with the war of attrition waged by his predecessor in
command, Westmoreland. While Westmoreland focused on body counts, Sorley wrote
that Abrams prioritized village security, building the capacity of the government of
Vietnam (GVN), and improving the logistical and war-fighting capabilities of the
ARVN.2 Ultimately, Sorley argued that perhaps Abrams’s greatest achievement was

1

Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of
America’s Last Years in Vietnam (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 1999), xv.
2
Ibid., 18.
9

marshaling the often-disparate efforts of the American military, embassy, and intelligence
apparatus towards accomplishing his ‘one war’ strategy.3
However, Sorley failed to compare Abrams’s ‘one war’ with the American effort
during the regime of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, who led South
Vietnam from 1954 until his death in 1963. For much of Diem’s regime, the American
footprint in South Vietnam was, compared to 1968, minimal and focused more on
developing the capabilities of the ARVN and GVN. While a series of coups effectively
militarized the GVN after Diem’s death, he and his family had offered a nationalist
alternative to communism and military dictatorship.
The American advisory effort under Diem differed from the Abrams period in a
key area: the Americans in Saigon during Diem often worked to crossed-purposes. This
uncoordinated effort contributed to the eventual American combat involvement in South
Vietnam when several members of the State Department (to include, perhaps, the
American ambassador in Saigon) advocated the overthrow of the Diem government,
resulting in the deaths of Diem and his principal advisor, and brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.
As the Americans argued over the best way to prevent South Vietnam from
falling to the communists, the British Advisory Mission (BRIAM) arrived in Saigon.
From 1961 until their departure from South Vietnam in 1965, this small group of British
counterinsurgency experts of the Malayan Emergency advised Diem and his immediate
successors.4 Operating independent of the American advisory effort, BRIAM advocated
securing the local Vietnamese population and using the Vietnamese Civil Guard as the
3

Sorley, A Better War, xii-xv.
Peter Busch, All the Way with JFK? Britain, the US, and the Vietnam War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 8-9.
10
4

primary means of combating the Viet Cong. The Civil Guard was a provincial-level,
paramilitary component of the Vietnamese police force, and by emphasizing their role in
the counterinsurgency fight, BRIAM attempted to turn the conflict in South Vietnam into
a police action instead of a military conflict.5 While the South Vietnamese, who had their
own strategy for securing their country, did not always follow BRIAM’s advice, the
methods advocated by the head of BRIAM, Sir Robert Thompson, foreshadowed much of
what was later implemented by Abrams, during Sorley’s ‘better war’ period.6
While Sorley wrote that Abrams began the ‘better war’ period in 1968, many of
the tenets of his strategy were already in place in 1963—except for the unity of American
effort. Indeed, American disunity helped lead to the coup against Diem, which in turn
created chaos in South Vietnam, necessitating (in the eyes of President Lyndon Johnson)
direct American involvement. The efforts of Diem’s regime, with assistance from
BRIAM and some of the American advisors, implemented Abrams’s ‘better war’ strategy
several years before his arrival in country. Therefore Abrams’s ‘one war’ was not a new
strategy as Sorley argued, but rather a return to what was, in many ways, proving
successful in the late 1950s and early 60s.
The South Vietnamese did not simply follow BRIAM’s advice. Rather, the plan
that Thompson submitted to Diem was used by the GVN to convince the Americans to
support its own counterinsurgency strategy: the Strategic Hamlet Program. Diem and
Nhu had already pursued a similar strategy of securing rural hamlets and villages, and

Robert Thompson, Make for the Hills: The Autobiography of the World’s
Leading Counterinsurgency Expert (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), 128.
6
Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of
South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 232.
11
5

while the Diem regime faced increased pressure from certain American factions to
reform, the brothers Ngo saw the arrival of BRIAM as an opportunity to ensure American
financial support while avoiding the political adjustments the United States often
advocated. Therefore, while BRIAM was a British effort to influence American advisory
efforts in South Vietnam, the mission also became a pawn in the Diem regime’s political
maneuvering against the various American factions that each demanded or advised
different strategies or reforms. It was in the face of communist attacks and foreign
demands that Diem used BRIAM to influence the United States in an effort to maintain
his nation’s sovereignty despite needing American largesse to survive.
At the same time, it was Diem and BRIAM's separate-but-similar strategies of
securing the population that most matched Abrams’s later plans. However, the efforts of
the GVN and the British were lost amidst the cacophony of Americans squabbling in
Saigon, and by the time the war effort had refocused on the South Vietnamese, the will of
the American people was lost. Despite the seeming success of Abrams’s tenure, US
forces withdrew from South Vietnam in 1973, leaving its government and its people to
fate’s mercy.
In A Better War, Lewis Sorley discussed the impact of Abrams’s assumption of
command of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam:
Shaped by Abrams’s understanding of the complex nature of the conflict, the tactical
approach underwent immediate and radical revision when he took command.
Previously fragmented approaches to combat operations, pacification, and mentoring
the South Vietnamese armed forces now became ‘one war’ with a single clear-cut
objective—security for the people in South Vietnam’s villages and hamlets. And
under a program awkwardly titled ‘Vietnamization,’ responsibility for conduct of the

12

war, largely taken over by the Americans in the earlier period, was progressively
turned back to the South Vietnamese.7
However, Sorley failed to mention that the war was the responsibility of the South
Vietnamese from 1954 until 1965. It was the American decision to directly intervene in
GVN politics, and then to deploy ground forces, that placed control of the war in the
hands of the United States.
From 1954 until their deaths in 1963, Diem and Nhu pursued many of the policies
that would later be included under what Sorley calls Abrams’s ‘better war’. Perhaps
most prominent of these was the Ngo brothers’ recognition that the war against the
communists was in many ways a war for the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese
people. They recognized that the war had to be waged at the lowest level, in the villages
and hamlets of the countryside. As a result, they implemented the Strategic Hamlet
Program, which called for securing rural villages and hamlets in order to protect them
from communist insurgents, delivering social services, and consolidating the Ngos’
control of the country.
Contemporary Americans and British advisors and diplomats had various
opinions of the success of the Diem government and its Strategic Hamlet Program. Some
found him and the program tyrannical, driving desperate peasants into the outstretched
arms of the insurgency. Others, however, believed the Ngo brothers were successfully
expanding government control in a fractured country still recovering from its war of
independence. Ultimately, it was these differing opinions—especially among Americans
in Saigon—that contributed to Diem’s downfall.
7

Sorley, A Better War, xiii.
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Many of the principal American officials and advisors during the Diem era waited
several years before publishing accounts of their experiences. Edward Lansdale’s
autobiography—In the Midst of Wars (1972)—and Cecil Currey’s biography of
Lansdale—Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American—tell slightly different versions of
Lansdale’s experiences with the CIA in South Vietnam. In his biography, Currey quoted
Lansdale as admitting that he wasn’t completely truthful in his autobiography. In the
Midst of Wars presents a very positive portrayal of the Vietnamese with whom Lansdale
worked, and he admits that he purposefully downplayed the American role in advising
them. The story was adjusted, Lansdale told Currey, to provide the Vietnamese with
heroes.8
Despite Lansdale’s caveat, both versions of his experiences in Southeast Asia
emphasized the agency of the Diem government. Lansdale’s autobiography relied
primarily on his own recollections, and, according to his autobiography, he was active in
South Vietnam from 1953 until the end of 1956, during the period in which Diem
consolidated his control of the country. Lansdale was absent from South Vietnam during
the latter half of Diem’s presidency (1957-1963), which encompassed the establishment
of the Strategic Hamlet Program, as well as the coup that killed Diem and his brother.
In his autobiography, Lansdale wrote, “There is the way the rest of the world does
things. And then there is the Vietnamese way.”9 Meeting Diem shortly after his
assumption of power, Lansdale commented, “Our association gradually developed into a

8

Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (Washington:
Brassey’s, 1998), 329.
9
Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to
Southeast Asia (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), 244.
14

friendship of considerable depth, trust, and candor.”10 Through this friendship, Lansdale
believed that he was able to help Diem help himself and his country; Lansdale claimed he
valued the agency of the Vietnamese above all else. Throughout the chapters in his
autobiography that address his time in Vietnam, Diem is portrayed as an equal partner,
not a local puppet with strings to be pulled.
Currey confirmed Lansdale’s attitude towards the Vietnamese in Edward
Lansdale: The Unquiet American, including quotes from one of Lansdale’s
memorandums. Although its recipient is unclear, Currey speculated it was similar in
content to a memorandum Lansdale sent to the United States Pacific Command. The
phrases within the brackets are Currey’s additions to Lansdale’s memo:
The crying needs [in Southeast Asia] are stable governments, technical and managerial
skills, and capital for [industrial] plants and tools . . .. [O]ur policy should be designed
to emphasize the pump priming kind of assistance which would enable these nations to
do for themselves . . . . This will require Americans of unusual ability, and patience.11
Lansdale’s emphasis on Vietnamese solutions to Vietnamese problems mirrored the
Vietnamization process described by Sorley in A Better War. However, Lansdale’s
memorandum was written in 1959,12 while Sorley studied the Abrams era (1968-1973).
Frederick Nolting was the United States ambassador to South Vietnam from 1961
until 1963, although Henry Cabot Lodge replaced him shortly before the November 1963
coup.13 In 1988, he published his memoirs of his time as ambassador, and relying on his
personal recollections and papers, the memoirs of other contemporaries, secondary
10

Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 159.
Currey, Edward Lansdale, 205.
12
Ibid., 387.
13
Frederick Nolting, From Trust to Tragedy: The Political Memoirs of Frederick
Nolting, Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s Vietnam (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1988), 111.
15
11

sources about American involvement in Vietnam, and government documents to make
the argument that “the tragedy [of American involvement in Vietnam] is that our political
mistakes, outweighing our successes and obscuring our motives, led our country into an
unnecessary war, with all its bitter consequences.”14
Throughout his memoir, Nolting emphasized Diem’s patriotism and independent
agency. While acknowledging Diem’s flaws, Nolting commented that during his
ambassadorship, “I continued to think that Ngo Dinh Diem’s government was the best
option available to lead South Vietnam and that with our help that government was
slowing [sic] achieving its goals of stability, protection, and progress for its people.”15
Nolting was present in South Vietnam during the establishment of the Strategic Hamlet
Program, and he wrote that Nhu and Sir Robert Thompson (the head of BRIAM) were the
ones that convinced Diem to implement it.16 He acknowledged that some hamlets were
established before sufficient resources could be allocated to them, but he thought that
despite some reports to the contrary, families were only rarely relocated under the
program.17 In general, he found it “was a sound concept and that its results were good.”18
Sir Robert Thompson’s books about his role in the Diem era, Defeating
Communist Insurgency (1966) and his autobiography Make for the Hills (1989),
supported Nolting’s opinion about the disunity of the American effort. Indeed,
Thompson commented that the real problem in South Vietnam was “to get the Americans

14

Nolting, From Trust to Tragedy, xv.
Ibid., 61.
16
Ibid., 54.
17
Ibid., 55.
18
Ibid., 56.
16
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and South Vietnamese to work out and adopt an overall strategic plan of campaign.”19 He
believed, too, that the Americans never understood the war, observing, “I had maintained
that the Americans could not win a victory in accordance with their concept of war unless
they defeated Hanoi in accordance with its concept of war. You do not win a chess game
by playing poker.”20
Thompson critiqued the American approach in both books, arguing that the
American prioritization of expanding the ARVN ensured that the military was the most
powerful institution in the country. Consequently, Diem had to devote a significant
amount of time to “manipulating the army commands in order to retain control and
maintain his position,”21 and maintaining the large ARVN required continued
dependence on American largesse.22
Instead of expanding the ARVN, Thompson argued the Americans should have
supported the creation of a larger police force. He compared the American emphasis on
military solutions to the British experience in the Malayan Emergency, commenting that
in Malaya, the army supported the civil authorities (such as the police) while in South
Vietnam the roles were reversed.23 Commenting on his experience in Malaya, he wrote
that adherence to law and order “creates the proper psychological attitude in the country

19

Thompson, Make for the Hills, 129.
Ibid., 153.
21
Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from
Malaya and Vietnam (London: Chatto & Windus, 1974), 58.
22
Ibid., 59.
23
Thompson, Make for the Hills, 128.
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20

as a whole, with the government as the ‘cops’ and the terrorists as the ‘robbers’.”24 By
implication, he felt this was lacking in South Vietnam.
To rectify the situation, Thompson wrote the Delta Plan, which was intended to
concentrate the disparate American and South Vietnamese efforts to secure the crucial
Mekong Delta.25 However, Thompson believed his plan was subsumed into the South
Vietnamese Strategic Hamlet Program, which he interpreted as Nhu’s attempt to solidify
his brother’s power base in the country.26 While eventually supportive of the Strategic
Hamlet Program, Thompson thought it expanded too quickly across the country (the
Delta plan had called for a slow expansion in the Mekong), and resources for building
strategic hamlets could not be allocated to satisfy demand. Unhappy with the results, he
eventually repudiated any involvement in what the program had become.27
Despite his frustration, Thompson was shocked by the manner of Diem’s death.28
As South Vietnam devolved into a cycle of military coups, the Americans were drawn
ever further into supporting a series of new ARVN regimes. Concurrently, Thompson
commented that many Americans were surprised by Kennedy’s involvement in Diem’s
death, and consequently, Diem’s reputation had to be destroyed to protect Kennedy’s
memory. “It was a great feast for the polemical jackals,” Thompson wrote.29 “The
carcass had to be mauled until there was nothing left.”30

24

Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 54.
Thompson, Make for the Hills, 129.
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Ibid., 139.
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Ibid., 142.
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Ibid.
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Diem remains a controversial figure, even in death, and this controversy is
reflected in the existing historical scholarship. There are two sides of the spectrum: on
one side are those historians who believe supporting Diem was disastrous. These writers
maintain that support for Diem equated to support for a repressive tyrant whose policies
created and fueled the communist insurgency in South Vietnam. On the other end of the
spectrum are those who believe that Diem was a Vietnamese patriot. To this group,
Diem encouraged South Vietnamese nationalism in order to create a functioning state
from the debris of the French withdrawal.
Seth Jacob’s Cold War Mandarin (2006) is indicative of the former school of
thought. He wrote, “Washington’s commitment to Diem may have been the most ruinous
foreign policy decision of the postwar era.”31 Elsewhere in Cold War Mandarin, he
commented:
None of America’s Cold War allies did more to undermine the power and reputation
of the United States than Ngo Dinh Diem. From 1954, when he became premier, to
1963, when he was assassinated, Diem ran South Vietnam as a police state while the
United States bankrolled his tyranny.32
While Jacobs is critical of Diem, Jacobs based his criticism on secondary sources and
American government documents. In Cold War Mandarin, Diem displayed independent
agency, but his comments and his actions are always seen through the American
perspective. That is, when Jacobs included Diem’s comments or attitudes, they are
comments and attitudes drawn from contemporary American reports and evaluations.
Considering the references included in his footnotes and bibliographic essay, Jacobs did
31

Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of
America’s War in Vietnam, 1950-1963 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2006), 8.
32
Ibid., 185.
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not incorporate Vietnamese language sources. Therefore, he reached his conclusions by
studying the South Vietnamese government through the attitudes and prejudices of
American (and, from his source list, apparently only American) officials, diplomats, and
military officers.
From these sources, Jacobs developed his opinion of the Strategic Hamlet
Program. While acknowledging Diem’s independence in establishing it without prior
American approval,33 Jacobs maintained, “Diem seemed less concerned with the
peasants’ needs or problems than with consolidating his rule in South Vietnam.”34 He
wrote that the program forced the relocation of large numbers of peasants, who were
required to leave ancestral homes for the defended perimeters of the new hamlets. While
the program was also designed to be a conduit for government efforts to improve living
conditions, Jacobs described it as more of a conduit for government money into the
pockets of corrupt bureaucrats.35 Despite the program’s designs, and despite American
financial support and the initial approval of Sir Robert Thompson (who, Jacobs wrote,
later disavowed the program), Cold War Mandarin maintained that the program’s poor
implementation ironically acted as a Viet Cong recruiting drive.36
Other historians have reached conclusions that stand in marked contrast to
Jacobs’s findings. Mark Moyar’s Triumph Forsaken (2006) and Geoffrey Shaw’s The
Lost Mandate of Heaven (2015) find Diem an effective Cold War warrior whose personal
independence and nationalist credentials made him a viable alternative to leadership by

33
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Ibid., 126.
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Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese. Indeed, Moyar argued, “Supporting the coup of
November 1963 was by far the worst American mistake of the Vietnam War.”37 Shaw
concurred:
Within a few weeks [of the November 1963 coup against Diem], any hope of a
successful outcome in Vietnam—that is, of a free and democratic country friendly
toward the United States—was extinguished. Truly, in order to solve a problem that
did not exist, the Kennedy administration created a problem that could not be solved.38
Apart from a few Vietnamese oral interviews and secondary sources, Shaw reached his
conclusions in much the same way as Jacobs: his relied overwhelmingly on American
primary and secondary sources. So, despite reaching different conclusions, Shaw and
Jacobs portray Diem and his government through an American lens. While Moyar, on
the other hand, made greater use of Vietnamese sources, he, too, relied heavily on
American accounts of the war. This suggests that dependence on American sources does
not automatically equate to support (or opposition) to Diem and his policies. Rather, it
suggests that the American and Vietnamese documents are read according to historians’
particular biases.
Perhaps predictably, Shaw and Moyar approved of Diem’s Strategic Hamlet
Program, seeing it as a path to victory. Moyar found that by 1963, contemporary
American assessments (while acknowledging the program’s shortcomings in establishing
some hamlets too quickly) had succeeded in creating confidence in the GVN among the
South Vietnamese peasantry.39 He maintained that initially skeptical American and

37
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British officials, namely Sir Robert Thompson, in South Vietnam eventually came round
to supporting the program, recognizing its use in defeating the communist insurgency. 40
Peter Busch’s All the Way with JFK? (2003) examined the Diem era from the
British perspective, and, based on government documents from Britain, the United States,
Australia, and New Zealand, in addition to a selection of memoirs and secondary sources,
concludes that Britain believed in America’s domino theory.41 Consequently, Whitehall
supported BRIAM because it saw the advisory group as way of reassuring its
Commonwealth allies in the Pacific and as a way of building the ARVN into an
organization that could defeat the Viet Cong—something the British felt the Americans
were incapable of doing.42
BRIAM found Diem an independent leader. Busch wrote, “Thompson as well as
the Americans found it impossible to persuade President Diem to implement all elements
of their advice,”43 but he acknowledged that “Robert Thompson quickly overcame the
initial difficulties with the American military and the US embassy in Saigon, and he
established himself as one of the most important, it not the most important, foreign
advisor to Diem’s government.”44 In All the Way with JFK?, the Americans provided
Diem with financial support, but the British gave the most influential advice, which
conflicts, of course, with Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American and In the Midst of
Wars.

40
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Busch based his assessment of relative influence on the apparent readiness of
Diem and the Americans to listen to Thompson’s advice.45 That being said, Busch
believed Thompson’s actual influence on the Strategic Hamlet Program, which
encompassed part of Thompson’s Delta plan, was rather limited.46 Busch wrote:
Thompson’s advocacy of Malayan-type measures in Vietnam helped to pave the way
for Washington’s acceptance of the Strategic Hamlet Programme, yet it is conceivable
that the South Vietnamese and the Americans would have pursued a similar policy in
any case.47
Ultimately, while the British were initially reluctant to support the program for fear of
being associated with a potential failure, they, and Thompson, soon backed it, despite
acknowledging several flaws in the way the South Vietnamese were executing it.48
Whereas Thompson maintained the GVN was winning the war, Busch argued that
Thompson was too quick to assume that the strategy the British used in the Malayan
Emergency, particularly the strategic hamlet, could be grafted onto the situation in South
Vietnam with similar results. Busch credits this hubris to “the fact that Thompson did not
find it necessary to devise original anti-guerilla schemes to fit the Vietnamese
situation.”49
While other historians debated the degree of British or American influence in
Saigon, Edward Miller’s Misalliance (2013) and Philip Catton’s Diem’s Final Failure
(2002) emphasized the agency and independence of Diem and his brother, Nhu. While
Catton examined American secondary sources and government documents, he also

45
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studied Vietnamese primary and secondary sources as well, some of which are from the
Vietnamese National Archives II in Ho Chi Minh City. As compared to the historians
discussed above, Catton incorporated the perspective of the South Vietnamese to a much
greater degree; they are lead actors in the drama, not simply reacting to American or
British cues.
Drawing on this Vietnamese source base, Catton examined the tensions between
Diem and his American allies, arguing, “that the conflict in US-Vietnamese relations
represented a clash between visions of national building and methods of modernizing
South Vietnam.”50 For Catton, this conflict culminated in the Strategic Hamlet Program,
which he sees as a failed South Vietnamese nation building effort.51 However, he
acknowledged that Diem and Nhu’s intent in establishing the program was to create a
secure, stable country possessing an ideological underpinning that rivaled or surpassed
the appeal of communism. As such, they saw strategic hamlets as generating “a
revolution in four areas: military, social, political, and economic.”52 Through
improvement in those four categories, the GVN would defeat the communist insurgency.
Eventually, American efforts during the Abrams era would mirror many of the Ngo
brothers’ goals in the Strategic Hamlet Program.
Catton believed Diem had an independent vision for his nation, and to accomplish
it, the Ngo brothers, who, Catton writes, did not see the Malayan Emergency and South
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Vietnam as comparable situations,53 played the British and American advisors in Saigon
against one another:
British officials would report with increasing concern this yawning gap between their
advice and the palace’s policies. They suspected, as did US officials, that the Ngos
flirted with BRIAM’s proposals in order to stymie US attempts to promote an
American plan of action and provide moral support for their own ideas.54
It would be Diem and Nhu’s reluctance or refusal to listen to American advice, especially
in regard to democratic reforms, that would convince some members of the Kennedy
administration to support the November 1963 coup.55
Like Catton, Miller relied on extensive Vietnamese language sources to argue
“that nation-building ideas and agenda played central roles in the formation, evolution,
and eventual undoing of Washington’s relationship with Diem.”56 BRIAM does not
figure prominently in Miller’s history. Rather, Miller noted that the Ngo brothers viewed
much of the British advice, which was based on experience from the Malayan
Emergency, “as inappropriate for Vietnam.”57 Instead, Miller wrote that Nhu was the
driving force behind the program, and he drew from the French experience in Indochina
and Algeria, not the British counterinsurgency model.58 Like Catton, Miller emphasized
that the South Vietnamese intent behind the Strategic Hamlet Program was to initiate a
reform in Vietnamese society along several fronts, although Miller wrote it focused on
social, political, and military reforms, leaving out Catton’s economic reforms, which
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Miller says were absent from the program.59 If these reforms were implemented
correctly, the Ngo brothers, especially Nhu, believed the results would lead to greater
self-sufficiency for South Vietnam and less dependency on the United States.60
However, in the interim, they recognized the program would require American
financial assistance, and with it, American advice. Many of the American advisors in
Saigon saw the Strategic Hamlet Program in a different light than the Ngos. While Nhu
envisioned it as a program to develop South Vietnamese self-sufficiency, the American
military advisors saw it as means to control the population during ARVN offensives.61
Meanwhile, the CIA believed the hamlets could be used as “a means to enlist the rural
population in the fight against the [National Liberation Front (NLF)],”62 the State
Department viewed them as replicas of the Malayan Emergency villages, and finally, the
US Agency for International Development considered the program as an opportunity to
spread democracy in South Vietnam.63
Despite conflicting visions for the Strategic Hamlet Program, Miller concluded
that for all the program’s shortcomings in execution, “it appeared to be part of a
remarkable turnaround in the government’s fortunes in its war against the NLF.”64
However, it also served as an example of the conflicting goals within the American
advisory effort and between the Americans and the South Vietnamese. These conflicting
visions for the future of the Republic of Vietnam would lead to the Ngo brothers’ deaths
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and a deepening American commitment in blood and treasure to stop the spread of
communism in Southeast Asia.
Sorley wrote that Abrams coordinated with the other American civilian
departments and agencies in Vietnam to prosecute the ‘one war’ strategy and
Vietnamization program. Arguably, this strategy was designed to join the conventional
war with pacification efforts and to build the capacity of the ARVN and GVN to conduct
independent operations.65 However, the South Vietnamese were conducting independent
operations during the Diem era, most prominently during the implementation of the
Strategic Hamlet Program (1961-1963). While historians and participants are divided as
to its results, nearly all agree the program showed an independent government seeking
Vietnamese solutions to Vietnamese problems, all in the name of securing South Vietnam
against communism.
At the same time, while historians and many of the participants agreed that the
strategic hamlet was a Vietnamese program, they debated the extent of Diem’s agency in
developing it. This thesis draws from the State Department documents found in the
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) and records from BRIAM and the British
Embassy in Saigon to support the work of Miller and Catton by arguing that Diem
displayed remarkable independence in maneuvering around his foreign advisors to
accomplish his own objectives, and it, therefore, disagrees with those that argue he was
an American puppet. Various American and British diplomats, spies, and military
advisors in South Vietnam and Washington, D.C. produced these documents to debate
the merits and success of the various tactics, techniques, and strategies they
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recommended to President Diem. But if there is a reoccurring theme amongst these
memorandums and reports, it is that the GVN was an independent entity that would not
necessarily obey the recommendations of its source of military and financial support: the
United States.
While Catton and Miller make similar assertions as to Diem’s independence, this
thesis builds on their work by emphasizing the role BRIAM played in Diem’s political
maneuvering. This thesis also extends on Catton and Miller’s arguments by connecting
their studies of Diem’s presidency to the policies that Sorely maintained were
implemented by Abrams during the latter half of America’s direct involvement in the
war. Sorely calls the period of Abrams’ command the “better war,” implying that the
United States had finally found the right general to implement what might have been a
winning strategy. This strategy centered on Vietnamization. However, the war had
already been Vietnamized during Diem’s presidency, and it was only direct American
involvement in South Vietnam’s internal politics that ended it.
Therefore, this thesis argues that Diem and his brother Nhu were independent
leaders of South Vietnam who used BRIAM to manipulate the various American factions
into supporting the Strategic Hamlet Program, which was an effort by the Ngos to
solidify their control of the country. Diem’s efforts represented a Vietnamese solution to
the communist insurgency, one the Americans supported. Abrams’s Vietnamization also
represented American efforts to support Vietnamese solutions to winning the war.
Therefore, Abrams’s program was, at its heart, a repetition of the United States’ strategy
during the Diem era.
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Similarly, Abrams’s emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of the South
Vietnamese people, as argued by Sorley, mirrored the plan BRIAM presented to Diem.
While this plan offered a foreign endorsement of what the Ngos had been doing with the
earlier construction of agrovilles, it also shows that what Sorely argued was Abrams’s
new strategy was actually a return to what had been done before. Consequently, the
better war began not with Abrams but rather in 1961, when Sir Robert Thompson
presented his Delta Plan to President Ngo Dinh Diem.
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CHAPTER II – ENTER THE AMERICANS: VIETNAM, 1954-1960
Disunity marked the American effort in South Vietnam from 1954 until Diem’s
death in 1963. The CIA, State Department, military advisors, and the American embassy
in Saigon had competing agendas and ideas about the path to a successful and
independent Republic of Vietnam, and these various entities often worked to crosspurposes. The disunity of effort led to significant friction amongst the important actors in
the drama of the early 1960s, and ultimately, the Americans did not develop an
understanding of the situation in South Vietnam that was shared across all the various
groups operating in country. Certainly, Diem and Nhu would take advantage of
American disunity. In the absence of a widely-agreed upon plan within the United States
mission in Saigon, the Vietnamese president was able to use BRIAM to influence
President Kennedy into supporting the Strategic Hamlet Program.
It is difficult to examine this period of American involvement in Southeast Asia
without seeing it through the lens of what followed. The wisdom of hindsight reveals
that the power vacuum created by Diem’s fall in 1963 contributed to significant
instability in the GVN and in the counterinsurgency efforts of its military, particularly
ARVN. However, evaluating and judging the American actors of this period from the
perspective of the present dismisses their contemporary concerns. The Americans
working in Washington, D.C. or Saigon saw events in South Vietnam as part of the larger
Cold War. While this global struggle against Communism was defined in the famous
“Domino Theory,” it was on the ground in places like Saigon that theory was transformed
into action. What form that action took, though, was a matter of debate.
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There were several primary American groups in Saigon during the period of the
Strategic Hamlet Program (1961-1963). The personnel staffing these entities—
particularly the CIA, the military, and the Foreign Service—built on the efforts of their
predecessors, whose work, in turn, was influenced by a different reality than the one
facing the Americans in the early 1960s. Consequently, the Americans in Saigon in 1961
operated within a political climate, and with Vietnamese leaders, that had evolved since
the end of Indochina in the mid-1950s.
Examining the American effort during this period does not discount the agency of
the South Vietnamese in determining their own destiny. Rather, it is to emphasize that
the Americans worked within their own understanding of the situation as they saw it. As
the principal financiers of the Diem regime—and as the ones bankrolling the ARVN—the
Americans had an outsized influence in Saigon. This would be a source of tension
between the Americans and the South Vietnamese president as Diem, after defeating
several of the groups that competed with him for power, sought to assert his own
independence and the sovereignty of his country. Indeed, he was determined that South
Vietnam would remain an independent nation partnered with the Americans in as equal a
fashion as possible. Diem and his family were resolute to the end in their efforts to show
his people, and the world, that he was not an American puppet.
A brief history of the United States’ involvement in South Vietnam is needed,
therefore, to understand American motivations in supporting or condemning the Strategic
Hamlet Program—and by extension, Diem’s efforts to secure his country. All actors and
factions within Saigon in the late 1950s and early 1960s made decisions built upon what
came before, and within the story of Southeast Asia, the United States arrived relatively
31

late. Before them were hundreds of years of human habitation along the banks of the
Mekong Delta and the slopes of the Annamese Mountains. Conflict between the
Vietnamese and Chinese, or between the Vietnamese and Khmer, gave way in the 1800s
to French control of not just Vietnam, but Cambodia and Laos as well, forming the
colony of Indochina.66
In the 1950s and 60s, the Americans in Saigon would work under conditions set
by French control of Indochina. Dividing Vietnam into three zones of control, Tonkin in
the north, Annam in the center, and Cochinchina in the south, which contained Saigon
and the Mekong Delta, the French ruled with varying degrees of intrusiveness. Tonkin
and parts of Annam later became North Vietnam, while the rest of Annam and
Cochinchina formed the basis of South Vietnam. Significantly, of the three regions,
Cochinchina was the only one that had been directly administered by the French. The
others, particularly Annam, were governed through local elites, who reported to the
Vietnamese emperor in the central city of Hué.67
The French style of rule purposefully kept much of the key decision-making out
of the hands of the Vietnamese. Consequently, there were few Vietnamese with
significant experience administering anything bigger than a district or village, and within
the colonial bureaucracy, there was an equal paucity of local nationals in any position
that required significant management expertise.68 As part of their colonial rule, the
French also established a Vietnamese army, but like the civilian administration and
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bureaucracy, French nationals filled most of the key leadership positions.69 The lack of
experience and governing expertise within military and civilian ranks at country-level
management would later complicate the Diem regime’s efforts to administer the nation
without significant outside support.
While France faced periodic Vietnamese opposition to its rule, and while the
Japanese occupied Indochina for much of World War II, the most significant challenge to
French control came in 1945, when Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnamese independence
after the Japanese defeat, beginning a concentrated communist military campaign against
the colonial occupiers. The United States had been involved in supporting Vietnamese
guerillas against the Japanese, and the Americans were at first reticent to entangle
themselves in French efforts to maintain control of Indochina. However, the 1948 fall of
Nationalist China to the Chinese communists and the beginning of the Korean War in
1950 changed the way the Americans viewed events in Southeast Asia.70 If the French
were defeated in their colonial war—Washington concluded—communism might
continue its march through Asia.
Over the course of the late 1940s and into the early 1950s, the United States
steadily increased the amount of aid flowing to the French fighting in Indochina. With
this aid came American advisors to assist in its administration and monitor the course of
French operations against the insurgents.71 This small group of American advisors—
termed the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Indochina—was the genesis for
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what became the large-scale deployment of hundreds of thousands of American military
and civilian personnel over the course of the 1960s and early 70s.
Despite American aid, the French were decisively defeated at the battle of Dien
Bien Phu in May 1954. As part of the peace agreement that ended French control,
Indochina was separated into Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Vietnam was partitioned
along the 17th Parallel into a communist north and noncommunist south, which eventually
became the Republic of Vietnam, although it was often referred to as South Vietnam.72
While the Vietnamese communists rapidly assumed control of their assigned portion, and
the French made preparations to depart the south, the Americans made plans to stay.
Ostensibly, MAAG Indochina continued operations in country to ensure the proper
accountability of equipment that had been given to the French. However, MAAG’s ranks
were expanded in mid-1954 to allow for the advising of Vietnamese military training.73
This mission was formally approved—and ranks expanded again—at the end of 1954,
further cementing long-term American commitment to the survival of the new nation of
South Vietnam against any possible communist aggression.
After the partition, however, the Americans in Saigon looked with dismay at the
seemingly dominant communist control of North Vietnam and felt apprehensive about
the future prospects of their new ally. Notwithstanding the communist threat, the
presence of various armed factions within the Republic of Vietnam—all of which had a
tenuous sense of loyalty to the new government in Saigon—did not auger success for the
continued existence of a democratic south.
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In their efforts to fight the communist guerillas in Cochinchina, the French had
armed and subsidized two Vietnamese religious groups, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, each
of which maintained powerful private armies after the peace agreement.74 Additionally,
in 1954, the South Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai, sold control of the Saigon police force
to the Binh Xuyen mafia, which had also been subsidized by the French to fight the
communists and additionally, controlled the city’s vice industries of opium and
prostitution.75 These three factions exercised significant power over South Vietnam’s
rural and urban areas, proving a potential obstacle to the central government’s efforts to
enforce its writ.
The Vietnamese National Army later renamed the Army of the Republic of
Vietnam, or ARVN, was the official armed force of the nation, and was, therefore, along
with the national police, charged with maintaining the state’s sovereignty. However, the
ARVN’s loyalties to the new South Vietnamese government were also tenuous. Many of
the senior officers had little to no experience managing large units or complex operations,
and ARVN’s leader, General Nguyen Van Hinh, was a French citizen married to a French
national, and he understandably wished to maintain continued close ties with France. He
also spoke openly of overthrowing the new South Vietnamese leader who was seen as
close to the Americans, which called into question Hinh’s loyalty to the state.76
Facing the communists and the armed factions within South Vietnam was its new
leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, a devout, monk-like Catholic, a workaholic, and a Vietnamese
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nationalist.77 Neither a communist nor a supporter of the French, Diem spent some years
in the United States as a political exile, where his anticommunism and staunch
Catholicism brought him to the attention of several politically influential Americans.78
Indeed, after his ascent to power in 1954, the US State Department initially viewed him
as the only local option available to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam.79
Diem, with American backing, quickly moved to establish control of his country.
Through political maneuvering, he managed to isolate Hinh from the support of the other
three factions, and towards the end of 1954, Diem was able to remove the general from
control of the American-funded ARVN.80 After Hinh fled to exile in Paris, Diem turned
his sights on the Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao. Through a combination of
realpolitik maneuvering and combat operations with the now more loyal ARVN, which
engaged in successful street fighting in Saigon against the Binh Xuyen army, Diem was
able to defeat his South Vietnamese opponents and remove Bao Dai from his position as
head of state by the end of 1955.81 With the emperor gone, Diem made the presidency
the official leading political position in the Republic of Vietnam.82
Having plenty of enemies and few friends in South Vietnam itself, Diem had
turned to his family to help him win control of the country, and this dependency
continued once he emerged victorious from the domestic power struggle of 1954-1955.
His reliance on his family to help govern the country would become a hallmark of his
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regime for the duration of its existence. It would also become a source of frustration for
some anti-Diem Americans who saw it as corrupt, undemocratic nepotism.
The Viet Minh had killed his eldest brother in 1945, so Diem leaned on the
remaining four. Ngo Dinh Thuc was a Catholic bishop who generated support for Diem
within Vietnam’s Catholic population.83 Ngo Dinh Can oversaw the family interests in
their home city of Hué and built a network of support in Annam.84 Ngo Dinh Luyen was
a former classmate of Emperor Bao Dai, and Luyen had proved a useful intermediary
with the imperial throne when Diem was initially maneuvering for the Vietnamese
premiership in 1954, shortly after the fall of Dien Bein Phu.85 Of all Diem’s brothers,
though, the most powerful was Ngo Dinh Nhu.
Nhu considered himself a philosopher and an intellectual. He was educated in
French universities, which gave him—like many of Vietnam’s intellectuals—a distaste
for what he considered the uncultured representatives of America and the United
Kingdom.86 Nhu was often quick to point out Americans’ lack of understanding of
Vietnamese culture. Such was the case when he explained an American faux pas to the
American Chief of the Pacific Command while Nhu was en route to the United States for
an official visit. The confused American admiral quickly sent a telegram to the general in
charge of MAAG Indochina, wiring:
At dinner last night [in Honolulu] Vietnam Special Ambassador and brother of the
President, Ngo Dinh Nhu, told me that the Communists make fun of president whose
name is Ngo Dinh Diem because Americans call him “President Diem” thus using his
first name Diem and not his family name Ngo which is equivalent to calling President
83
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Eisenhower “President Dwight” whereas Americans most always call the Communist
leader Ho Chi Minh by his last name Ho which is much more respectable. He should
be called Ambassador Ngo and not Ambassador Nhu.87
While the head of MAAG replied that Nhu was mistaken—that in fact, it was rather
common for the Vietnamese to refer to their leaders by their first name—it remains that
Nhu and the Americans had differing opinions as to what the Vietnamese people thought
and felt.88 It is possible, too, to sense the frustration of both the Americans and Nhu in
their dealings with one another; theirs was not a harmonious relationship. This
frustration would eventually boil over in 1963 when the Americans backed the coup that
killed Diem and Nhu.
One source of this friction, though, was that Nhu, despite being advised by the
CIA, was not beholden to the Americans for power, although the CIA did provide
funding for the Can Lao—South Vietnam’s ruling political party.89 Instead, Nhu’s
political power derived from his position as head of the southern faction of the Can Lao
and the country’s intelligence apparatus.90 While Diem’s brother Ngo Dinh Can oversaw
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the other, relatively cohesive Can Lao organization located in Hué, in the northern region
of South Vietnam, several other sub-factions existed within Nhu’s southern wing of the
Can Lao headquartered in Saigon, not all of which followed him.91 While Nhu was
certainly the most powerful Can Lao member in Saigon, his control of that particular
wing of the party was—from the American perspective—not complete. However, this
did not stop the United States from seeing Nhu as a source of the regime’s sometimes
heavy-handed response to internal opposition, and some American officials in Saigon
thought he should be removed from power.92
During the Strategic Hamlet Program, the Can Lao would be used to help spread
support for the Diem regime in the villages of South Vietnam. The party’s full name was
the Can Lao Nhan – Vi Cach Mang Dang, which translates to the Party of the Worker and
Personalism. Founded in 1950 by Nhu, the Can Lao was modeled on both the
Kuomintang and the Communist Party, adopting the latter’s use of cells and cadres to
project power and influence. The Can Lao also copied the centralized structure of both
organizations, going so far as to use the communists’ principle of democratic
centralization, in which final authority rested with party leaders.93
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The US Embassy studied the party and estimated that it was 16,000 strong. With
members located in positions of political and economic power throughout South
Vietnam, it engaged in business practices both legal and suspect, and embassy reports
note that “It appears that few important business transactions occur in Viet-Nam without
some benefit to the Can Lao.”94 While the embassy speculated that the money from these
transactions was typically used to support Can Lao activities, it also reported rumors that
Nhu, but not Diem, was growing unfairly rich on the trade, possibly damaging the
family’s reputation in the eyes of the Vietnamese people.95
The embassy also evaluated the perceived weaknesses of the party:
The Can Lao has no one leader. It is set up to be run as an authoritarian
organization, but authority is actually divided between the President,
Nhu and Can. Although Diem could exercise full authority, he devotes his
chief attention to security and economic problems. However, he is
understandably unwilling to grant complete authority to anyone else to run the
Can Lao. Nhu is best placed to run the party for the President but does not have
complete authority from the President and certainly, his writ does not run to
Hue which is under the tight hand of Can.96
While Nhu was nominally the Can Lao’s national chairman, the embassy speculated that
the absence of a clear party leader “evidently suits the President as a means of
maintaining an equilibrium between the two brothers and prevents either from becoming
too powerful.”97 From the perspective of the US Foreign Service personnel in Saigon,
then, while the Can Lao was a powerful apparatus, it lacked the true cohesion of the
Communist Party on which it was modeled. Regardless, the party provided the Diem
regime with a base of support within the country, and it was one of the means by which
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the Ngos would attempt to spread the doctrine of Personalism through the Strategic
Hamlet Program. However, the party—despite receiving clandestine support from the
CIA—also proved a lightning rod for American criticism of the Ngos’ autocratic
methods, exacerbating the tensions within the United States mission between those who
supported the South Vietnamese president and those who did not. Diem, in turn, used
BRIAM to exploit these American tensions in order to gain the United States’ support for
the Strategic Hamlet Program.
Indeed, the Can Lao was a cause of concern for the US Embassy and a topic of
conversation between Diem and Elbridge Durbrow, the American Ambassador in Saigon
in the late 1950s. Durbrow reported that while he had no objections to the Can Lao’s role
in running the country, he was concerned that its efforts to coordinate South Vietnam’s
developments might—through autocracy and corruption—do more harm than good.98 In
the same report, Durbrow noted that Diem complained that he was developing a
reputation in America for “being too arbitrary, dictatorial and ‘undemocratic”.99
According to Durbrow, Diem blamed his declining reputation on American journalists
who, after spending only a day or two in country, filed articles filled with scandalous
gossip and rumor picked up from the bars and cafes of Saigon.100 Durbrow concluded in
his telegram that Diem was also concerned that the Can Lao was being portrayed as a
nefarious covert force within South Vietnam.101
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The party’s shadowy nature seems to have bothered American diplomats.
Looking in from the outside, embassy analysts, perhaps prevented by security concerns
from coordinating with CIA analysts who also studied the party, struggled to discern the
true source of power within the Can Lao, a party with aspirations towards centralized
control but which to the Americans appeared as a collection of factions dominated by
several members of the Ngo family. While the Americans acknowledged that Diem was
the head of state, their reports presented a confusing array of groups within the
government’s power structure, suggesting they believed that Diem’s power was not
unassailable.
However, while the Can Lao existed independent from ARVN, embassy reports
noted that “Recently the Can Lao, acting through its Military Committee, has begun to
recruit some key officers in the military establishment probably in order to establish a
control mechanism within the only organization strong enough to challenge the
Government. Certain tensions have resulted.”102 One report also observed that ARVN
was the only organization in South Vietnam with the power to overthrow Diem and the
Ngo family, and consequently, the report reasoned, Diem would prevent Can Lao
activities that might instigate a military backlash.
Despite assumptions of Diem’s caution, the report also noticed that many ARVN
officers saw membership in the Can Lao as a prerequisite for promotion or desirable
assignments. There was notable concern within the embassy and ARVN that officers
returning from training schools in the United States were being passed over for key
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positions due to their perceived association with the Americans.103 The report observed,
however, that American military advisors believed that most, if not all, the promotions
were based not on party loyalty but merit, and indeed, MAAG had recommended many
of them. These American advisors reported that any link between an officer’s
membership in the Can Lao was incidental, and any concerns about too-rapid promotions
had to be weighed against the hard reality of ARVN’s dearth of experienced senior
leadership. Officers had to be found to fill key roles in the military hierarchy, and
consequently, allegations of favoritism were bound to surface—the advisors
maintained—as soldiers were promoted to fill vacancies in the chain of command. The
Americans concluded in this report from 1959 that they had not observed any decrease in
military efficiency from perceived actions of the Can Lao. The advisors stated that they
were trying to share this point of view with their ARVN counterparts; the Americans did
not report if their efforts were successful.104
The advisors’ report recognized the underlying tension between ARVN and the
political apparatus that Diem used to assert power throughout the country. Despite the
efforts of American military advisors to explain to their ARVN counterparts that the
promotion system was merit based, it seems the split between the South Vietnamese
military and civilian government persisted, at least from the American embassy
perspective. To Foreign Service officials, the root of this tension was the efforts of Diem,
Nhu, and the Can Lao (a party supported by the CIA, another element of the American
mission) to extend their influence into ARVN.
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During the Strategic Hamlet Program, the Can Lao would be used to help spread
the party’s doctrine of Personalism, which the Ngos believed was an alternative to
communism and liberal democracy.105 Derived from the ideas of a French Catholic
philosopher, Personalism sought to balance the collectivism championed by the
communists with the free markets advocated by capitalism by spreading the idea that the
individual—the most important element of society—can only reach his or her potential
within beneficial social and economic contexts.106
The ideas of Personalism were not fully understood by embassy analysts,
although an embassy dispatch from 1958 attempted an in-depth description. In the
dispatch, the analyst noted that in this philosophy, “the Human Person is endowed with
natural rights and duties, and that respect for these rights and fulfillment of these duties
would result in a social order where the individual enjoys true political and economic
freedom.”107 The report continued by describing Personalism as a blend of the “essence
of Western civilization” with “the cultural inheritance of Africa and Asia,” stressing the
importance of dignity in human and governmental interactions.108 The analyst used
nebulous terms in an attempt to describe a philosophy that was—by virtue of the fact that
it evokes nebulous terms—perhaps too vague to arouse widespread popular acceptance as
an alternative, third way that would enable South Vietnam to defeat communism and at
the same time, avoid the moral corruption of Western capitalism.
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However, there were attempts by the South Vietnamese leadership to transform
ethereal ideas into practical realities. Through the tenets of Personalism, Nhu advocated
the allocation of a plot of land to all Vietnamese families. There were several rationales
behind this plan, which presumably influenced the Strategic Hamlet Program years later.
The embassy analyst reporting Nhu’s idea believed that this land would provide the basis
for personal dignity as well as wealth that could be used for industrial investment. And,
as South Vietnam industrialized, the land grant would conceivably prevent the spread of
communism by providing economic support for what might otherwise be a poor urban
proletariat.109
Despite the seemingly egalitarian impulses of Personalism and Nhu’s plan, the
motives behind them were ambiguous to Foreign Service personnel in Saigon. The
embassy report continued with the observation that it was unclear to Americans in Saigon
if the Ngo brothers’ actions were driven by a faithful adherence to Personalism or if they
used the philosophy to legitimize what might otherwise be autocratic tactics. Expressing
his concern in writing, the analyst commented: “For example, are people encouraged to
move into the PMS and the Plaine des Joncs, taking up small plots of land for family use
as described by Nhu, because it is a wise plan, in consonance [with?] Personalist
doctrines, or are Personalist doctrines merely invoked in order to help achieve and help
justify the plan?”110
The analyst noted that few Vietnamese—beyond Diem and Nhu—seemed to
understand Personalism. When questioned, Vietnamese officials typically repeated
109
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official party lines instead of providing a more detailed explanation.111 The analyst
concluded his report with the pessimistic, “The various economic and social problems for
which Marxians claim they have ready answers still remain basically unanswered in
Personalist doctrine. There seems little popular acceptance of Personalism.”112
Personalism—the doctrine the Ngos planned to offer the South Vietnamese as an
alternative to communism—seemed little understood by any beyond Diem and Nhu, but
it was to be the doctrine the Strategic Hamlet Program would attempt to spread. The
Americans writing the embassy reports also appear perplexed by this seemingly vague
philosophy championed by a faction-ridden ruling party. From the American embassy
perspective, despite the allegations of autocracy leveled at Diem, the South Vietnamese
political scene was opaque and impenetrable.
The American mission in Saigon, however, was itself far from coherent in its
actions and policy towards the Diem regime. Different groups within the mission
pursued different means of achieving the desired goal of a non-communist South
Vietnam, as exemplified by the CIA’s support of the Can Lao, a party the embassy
accused of being undemocratic and that American military advisors were concerned was
undermining ARVN’s combat effectiveness. Diem would later use BRIAM to exploit
these kinds of divisions to gain American support for his own nationalist agenda, such as
the implementation of the Strategic Hamlet Program.
The United States mission was roughly divided into three principal groups: the
embassy, the military advisors, and the intelligence community—particularly the CIA.
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While the heads of each of these groups influenced the way their respective entity
articulated its policies and positions, the central leadership in Washington, D.C. provided
the general direction of the American position towards the government of South Vietnam.
The leaders of the military, embassy and intelligence apparatus in Saigon changed over
the years of American involvement, and consequently, while the embassy might pursue
one course of action or use a specific set of techniques under one ambassador, embassy
efforts might shift under another. So, too, with the other two groups. And throughout the
course of the United States’ involvement in South Vietnam, officials in Washington, D.C.
attempted to influence events within the larger Cold War context.
This larger context included the prevalent political mentality of the day: the
Domino Theory. This theory, first articulated during the administration of President
Eisenhower, originally maintained that if Indochina, and then South Vietnam, went
communist, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow. Under President Kennedy, the
Domino Theory was modified. His advisors believed that if South Vietnam were to fall
to communism, other democratic countries in Southeast Asia might not follow suit, but
American global prestige would suffer nonetheless. The Kennedy administration
believed that other nations around the world would lose faith in the ability of the United
States to protect them, threatening the stability of democratic nations located outside the
territorial confines of Southeast Asia.113 The threat of diminished American prestige—
which was detrimental to the United States’ efforts to contain the communist menace—
colored the perspective of the Americans assisting the South Vietnamese.
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Despite the shared belief of many within the American community in Saigon of
the necessity of preventing communism’s spread in the Republic of Vietnam, key
officials within the mission differed as to whether Diem was the local leader up to the
task. Rufus Phillips, who later led American efforts to support the Strategic Hamlet
Program, noted that under Elbridge Durbrow, American ambassador to South Vietnam
from 1957 until May of 1961, the American mission was divided between the
ambassador—who disliked Diem—and the chief military advisor, first Lieutenant
General Samuel Williams and then Lieutenant General Lionel McGarr, who had a
relatively positive relationship with the South Vietnamese president.114 The stark
contrast between the two camps in their relationship with Diem was thrown into relief
after a failed ARVN military coup in 1960.
While Diem prevailed against the paratroopers who tried to overthrow him, the
Americans believed that, in the aftermath of the coup, Diem had grown suspicious of the
possible involvement of the United States in the attempt to unseat him from power.
Within this atmosphere of paranoia, Durbrow sent a telegram to the Department of State
recommending that President Eisenhower not congratulate Diem on his regime’s
survival. Durbrow listed his rationale:
Several considerations lead me to recommend strongly against the President’s
sending Diem congratulations.
Principal reasons are:
1. Inadvisability of American President’s [sic] again identifying himself
with Diem until Diem shows clear signs of grasping and heeding lessons of
coup;
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2. Intemperate declarations of “Peoples Committee Against Communists and
Rebels,” an organization of GVN officials, which has accused American,
French and British “imperialists and colonialists” of having encouraged
revolt; and
3. Fact congratulations now might detract from stern attitude we may soon have
to take toward Diem.115

In general, Durbrow felt that Diem needed to expand his support base, primarily by
loosening the Ngo family’s hold on government. However, Diem was reluctant to do so
as he believed there were few in Vietnam outside his family and the Vietnamese Catholic
community that he could trust.116
Other American officials believed Durbrow was unfairly biased against Diem and
that this bias clouded his judgment of the situation. Lansdale, assigned to the Pentagon
after leaving his CIA assignment in Vietnam in 1956, provided commentary on the 1960
failed coup to the US Secretary of Defense. In his memorandum, Lansdale observed that
many of the officers and soldiers that revolted had had close ties to the Americans.
Consequently, Lansdale believed that Diem might “mistrust large segments of the armed
forces and, possibly, the utility of the way MAAG advisors are placed with Vietnamese
units,” and this could result in Diem assuming more direct control of the ARVN.117 If
this were to occur, Lansdale recommended, then MAAG advisors should work to assume
a greater role in advising Diem, at the expense of the State Department’s influence.118
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Lansdale wrote that he thought that the lesson Diem should take from the failed
coup was to “change his ways,” but Lansdale was also concerned that Durbrow was not
up to the task of advising Diem towards loosening his hold on the reins of power.119
Commenting on Durbrow’s relationship with Diem, Lansdale noted that the task of
encouraging Diem to “change his ways” typically fell to the US ambassador. However,
Lansdale felt that the South Vietnamese president did not trust Durbow, and perhaps,
Lansdale maintained, Diem even felt that Durbrow had—through public remarks—
encouraged the revolt in the first place.120 “Thus,” Lansdale concluded, “it would be
useful to get Durbrow out of Saigon. A graceful way would be to have him come home to
report.”121
Lansdale and Durbrow had not seen eye-to-eye before the coup. Several months
before the 1960 coup attempt, Durbrow had sent a telegram to the State Department to
give his opinion of Lansdale’s ability to add value to American advisory efforts.
Durbrow commented that he believed Diem wished to have Lansdale in Saigon because
Diem thought Lansdale might get the embassy to back off its demands for a more
inclusive South Vietnamese government. However, Durbrow was concerned that
Lansdale had been too long from South Vietnam to provide effective advice.122
Ultimately, Durbrow, acknowledging that Diem did not always listen to him, decided a
Lansdale visit might prove useful if several conditions were met: Lansdale was to follow
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orders from the ambassador, report everything that was said between himself and Diem,
and not to exceed 60 days in country.123 Writing to his superiors in Washington,
Durbrow commented, “I do not know Lansdale well enough to make firm judgment re his
effectiveness under present circumstances, but if you believe worth trying, I concur.”124
After the 1960 coup attempt, these two important actors—possessing various
levels of perceived trust from Diem—argued the possibilities of the failed coup’s
aftermath. While noting that Diem believed some Americans had supported the coup
attempt, Durbrow concluded that the situation in South Vietnam was dire, especially with
regard to US interests in the country and the region. He believed the communist
insurgency controlled large parts of the country, had only gained in strength, and that the
Diem regime’s autocratic methods were proving ineffectual to stem the rising violence.
The only way for the South Vietnamese president to improve the situation, Durbrow
reasoned, was for Diem to improve ARVN’s performance and increase his base of
support within the country.125 Looking ahead, Durbrow wrote to Washington that the
United States “should help and encourage [Diem] to take effective action. Should he not
do so, we may well be forced, in not too distant future, to undertake difficult task of
identifying and supporting alternate leadership. This is not for discussion with foreign
governments.”126 Lansdale’s ideas as expressed in his memorandum agreed with
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Durbrow’s sentiments (with the exception of Diem’s removal), but Lansdale did not think
that Durbrow was the one to help Diem make the necessary changes.127
While Durbrow returned to the United States in 1961, the conflict between the
ambassador and Lansdale was indicative of many of the conflicts occurring within the
American effort to support the Vietnamese. Many of these conflicts were rooted in
tensions between officials in Washington and personnel on the ground in Saigon, or
amongst the different groups within the American mission to South Vietnam. At their
source, these tensions typically arose from different viewpoints regarding how best to
advise Diem and fight the communist insurgency, as well as whether Diem and the Ngo
family were the right leaders for South Vietnam.
In the Department of State records, American officials discuss the extent that
Diem used the American squabbling to his advantage. Lansdale, who believed he had a
good rapport with the South Vietnamese president, was involved in many of the
American bureaucratic tensions of the late 1950s, from his position in the Pentagon
where he served primarily as the Deputy Director, Office of Special Operations, Office of
the Secretary of Defense from 1957 until 1963.128 In this role, Lansdale helped supervise
the activities of the clandestine agencies, and as many of the records of these
organizations are still classified, his memorandums and telegraphs from this period
provide insight into the thinking and activities of the intelligence community.129 He
believed in the ability of the Vietnamese to help themselves, but he often assumed an
127
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attitude of superiority towards those he thought he was helping. Indeed, Lansdale once
wrote “There is the way the rest of the world does things. And then there is the
Vietnamese way.”130 He elaborated by stating that this “Vietnamese way” could twist
how foreigners conceived of problems and solutions in Southeast Asia.131 Lansdale,
however, was determined to spread the ideals of democracy, commenting, “You should
know one thing at the beginning: I took my American beliefs with me into these Asian
struggles, as Tom Paine would have done.”132
In early 1960, Diem requested that Lansdale return to South Vietnam to advise
him on the current situation. Durbrow questioned Diem’s ostensible purpose for the visit,
writing in a telegram to the Department of State, “Do not believe Diem desires him as
much as advisor anti-guerrilla activities, but hopes use “old sympathetic friend” to
reverse pressure Dept and Embassy putting on Diem to take what we consider needed
steps his and our interests.”133 Despite sharing the same goal of a democratic South
Vietnam, conversations like this between officials in Saigon and their bosses in
Washington revealed a disconnect in the methods necessary to achieve that goal, and they
show a level of distrust with the South Vietnamese leadership. Key Americans in Saigon
assumed that Diem’s motives were—if not nefarious—at least designed to take advantage
of what even Americans saw as fractures within their own ranks.
The Americans were uncertain about their South Vietnamese allies, and they were
uncertain about themselves. When the Strategic Hamlet Program was launched by the
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South Vietnamese in 1962, it was done so within an environment of competing American
voices, which Diem and the Ngo family attempted to navigate while preserving their
nation’s sovereignty, fight the communists, secure American military and economic aid,
and—most importantly for the Ngos—remain in power. BRIAM’s arrival provided Diem
with the perfect opportunity to maneuver these competing American factions into
supporting his agenda for consolidating control of South Vietnam.
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CHAPTER III – VIETNAM, 1961: SETTING THE STAGE FOR
THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM
The British in Saigon did not always agree with their Americans counterparts.
Invited by President Diem, the small British Advisory Mission arrived in 1961 to provide
advice to the Republic of Vietnam’s counterinsurgency campaign.134 “Small” is an
understatement; BRIAM consisted of five advisors, and it was dwarfed by an American
mission numbering in the thousands. 135 Through the personal charisma of BRIAM’s
leader, Sir Robert Thompson, however, the British advisors gained a disproportionate
amount of influence with both the Americans and South Vietnamese. The Diem
government, for its part, often used BRIAM in attempts to manipulate the Americans,
while Thompson influenced the United States’ mission in South Vietnam by working
through Washington powerbrokers. Although the Strategic Hamlet Program was
ultimately a South Vietnamese planned and executed program, Thompson was
instrumental in securing American support—although he eventually disavowed it while
the Americans did not.
BRIAM’s collective résumé for advising the South Vietnamese rested on its
members’ experience in the Malayan Emergency, in which a British force had, over
several years, managed to defeat a rural communist insurgency.136 Consequently,
BRIAM claimed it possessed unique knowledge in fighting an enemy like the Viet Cong.
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Despite past British success, however, even President Diem acknowledged that Malaya
and South Vietnam had little in common beyond guerilla war.
Notwithstanding the differences between the two conflicts, BRIAM moved to
support Diem’s government, stepping into the political milieu of the Republic of
Vietnam. In Saigon, the Americans’ internal dysfunction combined with South
Vietnamese political maneuvering to create a confusing array of factions and competing
personalities. While the United Kingdom and the United States were allies, the UK—in
post-World War II economic decline—was unable and perhaps unwilling to provide the
financial aid the Americans showered on the Diem government. BRIAM, as a result,
became an example of the UK’s efforts to maintain its global influence and relevance
after losing much of its empire. At the same time, Thompson was convinced the
American and South Vietnamese counterinsurgency effort could be improved.
Prior to 1961, ARVN had pursued a largely conventional military approach to
fighting the insurgency. Under the influence of MAAG, South Vietnamese forces, armed
to fight a tank-wielding North Vietnamese military, swept through the countryside to kill
or capture communist insurgents. BRIAM, in contrast, advocated for the implementation
of the methods used in Malaya. Namely, Thompson argued that, after ARVN clearance
operations, Vietnamese villages should be secured and local villagers trained to defend
themselves, in conjunction with a paramilitary police force.
The Americans were initially resentful of BRIAM’s efforts to encourage Diem to
use the US-funded ARVN to achieve British-advised goals. Thompson, however, helped
sway the Americans to support what eventually became the Strategic Hamlet Program.
This program, while launched by the Diem government independent of BRIAM’s advice,
56

was a South Vietnamese plan to win the hearts and minds of the rural people. Although
backed by foreigners, the creation of strategic hamlets was Diem’s attempt to win the war
while maintaining his independence from his American advisors.
In the aftermath of World War II, the United Kingdom lost an empire. Struggling
to adjust to the post-war, post-colonial international order, Britain worked to develop
ways to maintain its global influence, exert its leadership of the Commonwealth, and
develop its alliance with the United States. In 1956, the Suez Crisis highlighted the UK’s
limitations in the new world order. After occupying the Suez Canal, British forces had
withdrawn in the face of political pressure from the US, the UN, and many of the
Commonwealth countries. The withdrawal demonstrated to Her Majesty’s Government
that its political power in world affairs was significantly diminished from its pre-war
glory days. It also showed the British that they would need US support if their overseas
actions were to be successful.137 BRIAM’s establishment, therefore, was an extension of
the UK’s search for its new role in global politics.
Regionally, British involvement in South Vietnam must be seen from the
perspective of the UK’s interest in Singapore, Malaya, and the other Commonwealth
countries of Oceania and Southeast Asia. During World War II, many of the
Commonwealth countries and British colonies in the Pacific felt the UK’s focus on the
war in Europe had left them unfairly open to Japanese aggression.138 Within that context,
the United Kingdom supported American involvement in South Vietnam because it
believed that if the Republic of Vietnam were to fall, it would hasten the spread of
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communism amongst the former British colonies in the region.139 Britain recognized,
too, that it lacked the resources the United States was able to bring to bear to support the
Diem government in Saigon.140
However, what Britain did possess was recent experience fighting a communist
insurgency during the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960.141 Diem had visited Malaya in
1960 to view the results of the UK’s successful suppression of rural guerillas, and during
that visit, he met Sir Robert Thompson.142 A graduate of the right British schools,
Thompson “liked horses, played tennis and golf, and enjoyed the odd glass of
whiskey.”143 While serving in Malaya, he established a new, nationwide system for
betting on horse races.144 His sociable nature would pay dividends later on when he tried
to establish a rapport with the Americans in Saigon.
Besides personal charisma, Thompson possessed experience borne from a
professional life spent in government and military service in Southeast Asia. After
graduating from Cambridge, he joined the Malayan Civil Service, arriving in country in
1938, on the eve of World War II. When the war started, he entered the Royal Air Force
(RAF) in Singapore before returning to the civil service, which sent him to China to learn
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Cantonese.145 When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941,
Thompson was skeet shooting on a racecourse in Macao.146
Involved in the defense of Hong Kong, he escaped as the city fell to Japanese
forces.147 As he moved through the Chinese countryside, Thompson used his personal
business cards (partly written in Chinese) to elicit help from Chinese soldiers and
guerillas. He noticed that, while his identification as a Malayan civil servant and RAF
officer provoked little response, the locals were impressed that he was a Cambridge
graduate.148 This fact would later impress the Americans, too.149
Thompson eventually linked up with the British military, and he was quick to
return to the fight. Assigned to work with Brigadier General Ode Wingate, Thompson
became a member of the Chindits, a formation of British and Commonwealth soldiers
trained to operate behind enemy lines in Japanese-occupied Burma.150 Describing their
job, he wrote they were “to ambush, to sabotage, and to disappear back into the
jungle.”151 In short, the Chindits were guerillas. Within this mission, Thompson’s duties
as an RAF officer were to coordinate for their air support and resupply.152
It was during his time with the Chindits that Thompson had his first experience
with guerilla warfare, albeit from the perspective of the insurgent, not the counterguerilla. As befitted his position as the officer in charge of air resupply, Thompson
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focused on coordinating for the logistical support necessary to sustain operations. While
he learned—through personal experience—“that the body can go for a long time on a
very meager ration,”153 he also found he had to rely on friendly Burmese villagers to
help collect supply drops or take care of wounded soldiers, underlining the importance of
civilian support for insurgencies.154 His service with General Wingate and guerrilla
operations in Burma made an impact on Thompson, and he believed that Wingate “had a
profound influence on me for the rest of my life.”155 Indeed, Thompson’s time in Burma
gave him first-hand experience as a guerilla, an experience that would help him
contribute to the successful counterinsurgency operation against the communists in
Malaya.
Thompson returned to Malaya in 1946, after war’s end and a brief sojourn in
England.156 The insurgency started shortly thereafter, and, from his position in the
Malayan Civil Service, Thompson was drawn into operations to defeat it. Despite his
primarily civilian post-war identity, he was re-commissioned and at the fighting’s start,
he led a small infantry unit on patrols.157 Thompson was quickly pulled, however, into
the leadership that consolidated around Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs, who
assumed control of the British effort in the early 1950s.158
The communist insurgency in Malaya differed significantly from the one that
would emerge against President Diem. In the Malayan Emergency the majority of the
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communists came from the Chinese minority; they were visibly different from their
Malayan neighbors.159 Geographically, the two countries were also dissimilar: while
Malaya was a peninsula, which limited the insurgents’ ability to resupply or maneuver,
South Vietnam’s western border with Laos and Cambodia was covered in jungle and
used by the communists to reinforce and logistically support their operations.160 This
route was called the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and Thompson noted that “it is only necessary to
look at the map to see that this trail was vital for North Vietnamese infiltration and that,
without it, the war could not have been waged.”161
These differences would become apparent to Thompson when he traveled to
Saigon in 1961 to lead BRIAM. Until then, he was part of British efforts to defeat the
Chinese communist insurgents in Malaya. From his position on staff, Thompson was
involved in what became known as the Briggs Plan, which had three parts. First,
military, police, and civil government efforts were synchronized under a single leadership
structure. Thompson wrote that this structure achieved “not co-ordination by coordinated action.”162 Next—and this would have direct bearing on the future South
Vietnamese Strategic Hamlet Program—the estimated half million Chinese who were
squatting on government land and supporting the insurgents were resettled into new
villages. Police and local Home Guard units defended the new villages, and Thompson
believed this resettlement deprived the guerrillas of recruits and supplies.163 Finally, the
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British in Malaya enforced strict laws that, according Thompson, allowed the government
to hang terrorists, which included “anyone carrying arms, ammunition or explosives
without a licence.”164 Expanded detention rules resulted in thousands of additional
detainees, and new measures to control food supplies included ordinances that cans of
food were to be punctured when sold, which necessitated rapid usage in a climate where
food quickly spoiled.165 Additionally, the colonial authorities were authorized to deport
Chinese to China, and on at least two occasions, British forces surrounded guerilla
strongholds and arrested and deported every Chinese civilian in the area.166
The Malayan police force expanded during the emergency, and it took the lead
fighting the communists, with the armed forces operating in support.167 And unlike the
Americans in South Vietnam, the British were not functioning in an advisory capacity.
With the appointment of Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templar as both civilian high
commissioner and military director of operations (replacing General Briggs), total control
of the counterinsurgency effort was centered on one British officer.168 Therefore, in
addition to the geographic and ethnic differences between the insurgencies in Malaya and
South Vietnam, the British were able to pursue a strategy against the communist guerillas
that derived from their total control of Malaya, allowing them to dictate events in ways
the Americans in Saigon could not.
The Americans’ limited role colored the relationship between the Diem
government, the American mission, and BRIAM. The South Vietnamese president
164

Thompson, Make for the Hills, 93.
Ibid.
166
Ibid.
167
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 103.
168
Ibid., 16, 18.
62
165

would exploit the fissures amongst the Americans and between BRIAM and the US
country team in order to promote his own agenda. And in the early 1960s, competing
British and American counterinsurgency strategies proved to be Diem’s point of
manipulation.
Concerned with finding a better way to defeat the Viet Cong, MAAG and State
Department personnel developed a counterinsurgency plan (CIP) for South Vietnam in
early 1961.169 Before its publication, the ARVN’s efforts to defeat the communist
insurgency focused on securing key population centers and roads. Many South
Vietnamese military units were tied down in defensive positions, reacting to communist
actions. These units would conduct periodic sweeps that had little lasting effect.170 To
remedy the situation, the CIP recommended several changes: ARVN should be expanded,
the Civil Guard should be transferred to the Vietnamese Department of Defense, and
ARVN’s command and control system should be simplified.
MAAG officers were especially critical of Diem’s techniques for directing
military operations.171 ARVN officers typically reported to the chief of the province in
which they were stationed. As the province chiefs answered directly to Diem, the South
Vietnamese president was effectively able to bypass the military’s chain of command.172
However, Diem’s habits were not the product of impatience. Rather, commented the
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CIP’s authors, Diem’s style seemed “to have been designed to divide responsibility in
order to guard against the possibility of a military coup through placing too much power
in the hands of a single subordinate.”173
The CIP was also concerned that the Civil Guard—a paramilitary police force
tasked with internal security—had been overwhelmed by the scope of the communist
insurgency, necessitating ARVN assistance, which undermined the army’s ability to
guard against an external threat.174 Consequently, the plan recommended moving the
Civil Guard to the control of the South Vietnamese Department of Defense, which would
allow the guard to receive military training and military-style weapons from MAAG. At
the same time, the CIP recommended that ARVN temporarily assume some of the Civil
Guard’s security duties to enable the Civil Guard to retrain for military-type
counterinsurgency operations, although ARVN would remain as the primary counterguerilla organization.175
Besides reorganizing the structure of the security forces, the CIP also suggested
that the Diem regime increase coordinated propaganda and civil development to support
military operations against the insurgency. These military operations would take the
form “net and spear” tactics, and consisted of small units (the “net”) moving from
pacified areas into the jungle to hunt communist guerillas.176 Once found, the net would
call for the “spear”—the mobile reserve—to destroy the Viet Cong unit. The American
military advisors reasoned that, once the communists in a certain area had been
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destroyed, ARVN units would push out into new areas, expanding the reach of the
government.177
Writing in 1967, the authors of the Pentagon Papers reasoned that it was “not
clear how well refined either concept [Diem’s original static defense tactics or the new
American “net and spear” methods] was, or (with hindsight) whether the American plan
was really a great deal more realistic than Diem’s.”178 The Pentagon Papers stressed that
the CIP’s primary purpose seemed to be to encourage the Diem regime to develop a
systematic plan for clearing Viet Cong controlled areas, “instead of tying up most of his
forces defending fixed installations, with periodic uneventful sweeps through the
hinterland.”179
It is significant that in its initial form, the CIP was primarily concerned with
military operations. The final version—after input from the US Embassy and the State
Department—introduced more civil reforms, which included encouraging the South
Vietnamese president to bring his political opponents into the government.180 The CIP
also proposed an increase in US funding to allow for the additional recruitment of 20,000
ARVN soldiers.181 However, in early 1961, during negotiations with Diem for the CIP’s

177

United States-Vietnam Relations, Part IV.B.1., 10.
Ibid. “The Pentagon Papers” refers to United States-Vietnam Relations, 19451967. This report was compiled from 1967-1969 at the behest of then Secretary of
Defense, Robert McNamara. His intent was to develop a comprehensive study of
America’s gradually increasing involvement in Vietnam from 1940 until 1967.
179
Ibid.
180
United States-Vietnam Relations, Part IV.B.1., 10-11.
181
Ibid., 11.
65
178

implementation, the Americans emphasized that any additional money would be
dependent on his acceptance of the State Department’s recommended civil reforms.182
These reforms, of course, would have undermined Diem’s control of South
Vietnam, something he was quite reluctant to do without reassurances of continued
American support for his government.183 Additionally, any hint that financial support
would be withheld seemed counter-productive to some American observers. A weakened
Diem regime might encourage a coup, and Lansdale, for one, argued that the alternatives
to Diem could be much worse, creating a power vacuum the communists might
exploit.184 President Kennedy was also familiar with past outcomes of efforts to
influence foreign governments by withholding aid, having been a congressman when
Truman pressured Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalist China with similar tactics. Without
American money, the Chinese communists defeated Chiang, and the loss of a pro-West
government in China had had significant negative political ramifications for the
Democratic Party.185
As the Americans debated whether threats to withhold aid would effectively force
Diem to make changes to his government, the United Kingdom prepared to send
Thompson and his fellow Britons to Saigon. In part through American and British
diplomatic encouragement, and perhaps in part from his own designs, Diem had invited
the UK to send an advising team in August 1961.186 In that same month, the British
Foreign Secretary informed his American and French counterparts that the United
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Kingdom thought the situation in South Vietnam had gotten worse. Consequently, the
Foreign Secretary said, Her Majesty’s Government had finalized the necessary
coordination for Thompson to go to Saigon “with rather a small mission. There is
nothing that Thompson doesn’t know about counter-insurgency methods, and he should
be able to be of help.”187
Despite British assurances as to the competency of Thompson and his team, and
despite the fact that BRIAM was in Saigon at Diem’s invitation, some Americans,
particularly in MAAG, were hesitant to welcome the newcomers. While the State
Department had worked to encourage American allies to support the anti-communist
effort in South Vietnam, the general in charge of MAAG sent a telegram in June, 1961 to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressing his concerns about the impending
arrival of the British training mission.188 The general wrote that, while he understood that
American diplomats were exerting pressure on the US military to involve British advisors
in MAAG’s anti-guerilla training programs, he thought these outside influences would
confuse the South Vietnamese. MAAG had a way of doing things, the general stated, and
these allies might provide advice that would run counter to what the Americans were
attempting to teach. The general reserved special criticism for the incoming BRIAM
team: “I am unable here to pin down ‘Thompson group’ qualifications and, more
important, its authority; only that they are anti-guerrilla ‘experts.’ Feel we must insist
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they convince us by furnishing concrete anti-guerrilla material for our evaluation and
consideration before we approve their coming.”189
Writing from his desk in Washington, Lansdale also voiced his reservations about
British advisors in South Vietnam. His concerns were threefold. First, he disliked the
idea of foreigners deciding how the Vietnamese would spend American aid, which
“would be what would happen in reality if a persuasive British ‘expert’ were placed to
advise President Diem and his appointed assistants on these [counter-insurgency]
operations.”190 Second, the conflict in South Vietnam was not like the one in Malaya,
and therefore any British advice was of little use. And finally, Lansdale believed that
before looking to the UK for help, the Americans should draw from their own counterguerilla experiences. He specifically mentioned the recent American-Filipino anticommunist campaign in the Philippines, in which he played a key role, noting that that
effort “stands up well against the British accomplishments in Malaya.”191 Lansdale
summarized his position with the admonishment “All we have to do is remember the
lessons we learned in the very recent past, and to make use of them wisely and
energetically.”192
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Ultimately, the State Department’s desire for British participation prevailed over
the hesitations of the military advisors, but negotiations between British and American
diplomats in Saigon established only vague boundaries as to what realms BRIAM would
confine itself. Eventually, the ambassadors reached a general consensus that the British
would leave MAAG to continue its military advising, and BRIAM would instead concern
itself with providing guidance to the South Vietnamese regarding civic actions and
intelligence operations.193 This informal understanding was designed to provide
flexibility for American and British advisors on the ground to work through any friction
points as they occurred.194
Despite the British ambassador’s informal agreement to limit BRIAM’s activities
to advising civil and intelligence operations, upon his arrival in South Vietnam in
September 1961, Thompson—while possessing little previous experience with the
country—did not hesitate in commenting on American military advising. During his first
tour as the head of BRIAM, he quickly identified what he saw as the shortcomings of the
United States’ effort, writing that as of 1961, “No one had looked at the French record
and no American we met had read Mao.”195
In Thompson’s opinion, one of the failings of the American effort was its inability
to see counterinsurgency as anything but a military campaign.196 He saw the American
attempt to support Diem while simultaneously fighting the Viet Cong as disorganized. A
1962 visit to Washington, D.C.—with stops at the Pentagon, State Department, and
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CIA—left him with the impression “of a vast machine completely unco-ordinated, rather
like a large four-engined aircraft with its engines unsynchronized.”197 From his travels
around the South Vietnamese countryside, Thompson deduced that the “Americans (and
the very great majority involved in Vietnam were only there for short spells) never
understood that to win the war they had to build a country. It could not be won by
military means alone.”198
Drawing from his experience in Malaya, Thompson believed that to be successful
in defeating the Viet Cong, the South Vietnamese government needed an overarching
strategy that encompassed more than military operations:
It must include all political, social, economic, administrative, police and other
measures which have a bearing on the insurgency. Above all it must clearly define
roles and responsibilities to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure that there are no
gaps in the government’s field of action.199
Despite the ostensible limitations on BRIAM’s ability to advise the South Vietnamese on
military operations, Thompson wished to rectify what he saw as one of the main
differences between British operations in Malaya and American advice to Diem. “In
Malaya, the army supported the civil power during an ‘emergency’ but in Vietnam, the
civil power, where it existed, supported the army in a war.”200
The American CIP certainly fit Thompson’s critique. While civic actions and
political reforms were part of the plan, they were either added later, through State
Department suggestions or were included so as to maximize the effectiveness of net and
spear tactics. Indeed, the Americans encouraged civil reform to improve the
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effectiveness of military operations. Thompson, however, saw the situation differently,
and, putting his ideas into writing, he produced the Delta Plan in the fall of 1961.201
Thompson reasoned that, despite the largesse of the United States, the Americans
and South Vietnamese lacked the resources to implement local civil reform and defeat the
communist insurgency in every province at the same time, but which the South
Vietnamese were nevertheless attempting to do in early 1961.202 Instead, he argued
that—within a larger countrywide campaign plan—resources should be concentrated in
one region to secure and develop it before moving on to the next. Thompson determined
that the Mekong Delta, home to South Vietnam’s best rice fields, had a weak Viet Cong
presence and would, therefore, be an easy place to start.203 He noted, “The Americans, of
course, preferred to tackle the toughest areas first and were impatient for action and
results.”204 Rather than marshal resources to secure the delta, the United States wanted
ARVN to focus on Zone D, a communist stronghold to the north of Saigon.205 Thompson
believed, however, that starting a new counterinsurgency plan in a heavily contested area
would doom it to failure; the enemy would be able to destroy friendly outposts while they
were in the process of being established.
Thompson’s Delta Plan did have some similarities to the CIP. Like the
Americans, Thompson called for the establishment of a consolidated chain of command.
He noted that in the Mekong Delta, each province conducted its own small war effort;
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there was little to no coordination between province chiefs, who controlled the military
forces within their respective areas. This poor coordination was exploited by the Viet
Cong guerillas, who were able to shift efforts across the region depending on the different
government activity in each province.206
Thompson therefore proposed the creation of a unified regional command, in
charge of the entire counterinsurgency campaign in the Mekong Delta. This command,
consisting of an ARVN corps headquarters, would coordinate not just military operations
but the government’s intelligence, propaganda, and civic action programs as well,
providing an overarching strategy to replace the uncoordinated, piecemeal actions of the
South Vietnamese (as they appeared to the British and Americans).207 Perhaps most
importantly, it would report directly to the Diem-controlled National Security Council in
Saigon, bypassing the leading ARVN generals.208
Thompson’s proposed regional command highlights a key difference between the
reforms recommended by the Americans and those suggested by BRIAM. In the CIP,
ARVN units would respond to a centralized chain of command that imitated the
Americans’. Operational plans would be developed by military staff and would flow
from the generals in Saigon through subordinate commands to units in the field. The
province chiefs were removed from the process.209 Thompson’s Delta Plan, on the other
hand, left the province chiefs within the military decision-making system and placed the
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regional effort directly under Diem’s control, maintaining the president’s grip on the
ARVN.210
There were conceptual differences between the CIP and Delta Plan as well. The
American plan was intended to accomplish the stated mission of “Defeat Communist
insurgency efforts in [South Vietnam].”211 In contrast, Thompson argued, “The overall
aim of any counter insurgency plan must be to win the people. The killing of communist
terrorists will follow automatically from that.”212 While the United States considered
South Vietnam primarily a military problem to be solved with civic operations in support,
BRIAM looked at it as an issue of nation building that required the central government to
secure its population.
To that end, Thompson’s plan recommended the establishment of strategic
hamlets, consisting of 200 to 300 hundred houses clustered together behind formidable
defenses. He suggested relocating some families to facilitate the establishment of this
perimeter.213 Local self-defense groups would protect these hamlets, as “all peasants
have a natural instinct for small-scale guerilla and anti-guerilla operations.”214 But he
argued that in the event of an emergency, they would be supported by the Civil Guard, a
paramilitary police force designed—in Thompson’s opinion—to be the primary internal
security force in each province. ARVN’s role within the Delta Plan would be to clear
areas of large guerilla units so that strategic hamlets could be established. Once the
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hamlet’s defenses were constructed, the military would move on to the next contested
area, leaving the Civil Guard to take the lead in counterinsurgency operations.215
According to the Delta Plan, after establishing a strategic hamlet, the Diem
regime should then prioritize building schools and medical facilities, and the
communication infrastructure should be improved to spread pro-government
propaganda.216 However, even within the delta region, the South Vietnamese
government did not have enough military, police, and logistical resources to build
strategic hamlets everywhere at once. Therefore, Thompson argued that, just like at the
national level, it was crucial that strategic hamlets be constructed systematically, securing
one zone before moving to the next.217
While he was presented with two different plans to secure South Vietnam,
President Diem had his own strategy for defeating the communist insurgency. Indeed, as
the negotiations for the CIP’s implementation dragged out over the course of 1961, Diem
looked to exploit the internal divisions within the United States mission in Saigon. These
divisions had existed long before the CIP but now found new outlets. While many State
Department officials believed that financial pressure should be leveraged to force the
South Vietnamese regime to accept democratic reforms, many military advisors argued
that such pressure would be self-defeating. They maintained that, without funding, Diem
would fall, which would create a power vacuum the communists could use to their gain.
Wanting to maintain the flow of American money without implementing American
changes to his rule, Diem would use Thompson’s Delta Plan to gain American support
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for a South Vietnamese-developed effort to defeat the insurgency and strengthen the Ngo
family’s hold on the country.
Meanwhile, in an effort to determine a way forward from the stalled CIP
negotiations, President Kennedy prepared to send General Maxwell Taylor to Saigon in
late 1961 to develop yet another American advising plan. Thompson had met Taylor
earlier that year, during a visit to Washington.218 Now Thompson would use Taylor’s
visit as an opportunity to convince the Americans to support his vision of a civil solution
to the fighting in South Vietnam.
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CHAPTER IV – A VIETNAMESE SOLUTION TO A VIETNAMESE PROBLEM,
1961-1963: THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM
As 1960 began, the Americans were concerned that Diem’s campaign against the
communists in South Vietnam had become a meandering collection of directionless
wanderings. To military and political observers from the United States, it appeared that
ARVN forces were tied down in defensive positions, reacting to Viet Cong attacks with
ineffective sweeping operations that achieved little beyond forcing the Viet Cong to
blend back into the jungles. Despite the military and financial aid the United States was
devoting to South Vietnam’s defense and economic development, the Americans thought
little was being accomplished.
The perceived absence, to the Americans, at least, of a coherent South
Vietnamese counterinsurgency plan was one of the principal reasons they blamed for the
lack of results.219 With the idea that the production of any plan would at least create a
starting point from which to operate, the United States mission to South Vietnam wrote
the counterinsurgency plan (CIP) in 1960 and 1961. Besides an offensive mindset, this
plan called for the simplification of the ARVN chain of command. Diem had divided
control of military forces in the provinces between two structures: the military hierarchy
and the provincial chiefs, who had control of the Civil Guard, elements of the SelfDefense Corps (a local militia organization), and any ARVN forces assigned to static
positions. The control the ARVN chain of command did have was typically limited to
forces assigned to operations with defined time limits. Consequently, under the existing
situation, Diem was able to exert significant control over the armed forces of the
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Republic of Vietnam as the provincial chiefs were appointed by, and answered to, him.
This situation helped Diem maintain his grip on power, but in the Americans’ opinion, it
also hindered effective ARVN military operations. The CIP, if implemented, would
remove the provincial chiefs from command of ARVN forces. This change was
unpalatable to the Diem regime, and it was hesitant to accede to any plan that called for
it.
However, in the latter half of 1961, Thompson’s Delta Plan proved an attractive
alternative to the South Vietnamese. It allowed Diem to maintain a significant amount of
control over the ARVN, and by accepting it, he showed, too, that he was responsive to
foreign advice. Diem’s enthusiasm for Thompson’s plan frustrated MAAG, whose chief
commented that the Briton’s actions equated to “the case of a doctor called in for
consultation on a clinical case, actually performing an amputation without consulting the
resident physician—and without being required to assume the overall responsibility for
the patient.”220
Certainly, Thompson’s development of the Delta Plan was derived from
contemporary British concerns with the American advisory effort in South Vietnam. In
short, the British did not have confidence in the United States’ ability to guide the Diem
regime towards victory against the communists, and Her Majesty’s Government believed
a communist takeover of South Vietnam would threaten British interests and possessions
in the rest of East Asia, further diminishing British global power in the post-World War II
environment. Thompson’s Delta Plan reflected both the British experience in the
Malayan Emergency and his personal belief that Vietnam’s insurgency was primarily
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political in nature. This assertion put his plan squarely at odds with MAAG, which
maintained that the Diem regime should pursue an essentially military solution to the
communist threat. However, the solution purposed by MAAG had the potential to draw
the United States deeper into what was, at that point, a war of secondary importance in
American foreign policy. So when Thompson passed his plan to Maxwell Taylor, who
was visiting Saigon on behalf of President Kennedy, his ideas found a ready audience
within the American government.
At the same time, Diem presumably saw in Thompson’s plan an opportunity to
demonstrate to the Americans that he was willing to accept foreign advice, which had
become a precondition for the continuation of American aid, although his preference for
the British plan vis-à-vis the American one initially frustrated the United States mission
in Saigon. Additionally, Thompson’s Delta Plan, which called for the creation of
strategic hamlets, was essentially the evolution of another, ongoing counterinsurgency
plan that the Ngo brothers had been pursuing: the agrovilles. The agrovilles were an
earlier South Vietnamese attempt to control and secure the South Vietnamese population,
and in accepting the Delta Plan, and by implementing it on a larger scale, Diem seemed
to hope that the Americans would continue funding his government, allowing for this
Vietnamese counterinsurgency program to expand in scope and ambition. Besides
working to secure the rural population from Viet Cong attacks, the Strategic Hamlet
Program would serve, too, as a vehicle for the Diem regime to control its own population,
propagating its ideology of Personalism as both an alternative to communism and a way
to built support for the government in Saigon.
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From 1960 through 1961, many of the decisions the Americans and South
Vietnamese made in Saigon occurred within the context of the Laotian crisis, which was
precipitated by repeated communist victories there against pro-western forces. During
the ensuing peace negotiations, President Kennedy decided not to commit US military
resources to support the pro-west Laotians but instead favored a coalition government—
despite evidence that communist forces in Laos would retain significant power in the
country.221 Consequently, Kennedy, already influenced by the fall of Chiang Kai-shek
after American support was withheld, decided a show of support for the South
Vietnamese government was necessary to display to Southeast Asian leaders that the
United States would remain committed to friendly governments in the region.222
Subsequently, as negotiations with Diem for the implementation of the CIP
dragged on, the Kennedy government became more agreeable to the idea of supporting
him even in the absence of political reforms. Therefore, within this context, the Kennedy
administration sent several missions to South Vietnam to see what could be done to
rapidly work with the GVN to arrest the growth of the communist insurgency.223 General
Maxwell Taylor, from his position as the president’s military advisor, led the last visit in
1961.224
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The Taylor Mission, as it was called, arrived in Saigon on October 18th, 1961 and
stayed through the 24th of that month.225 Prior to its arrival, Diem, viewing the situation
in Laos, had brought up the possibility of a joint US-South Vietnam defense treaty with
the intent to secure a formal American commitment to the survival of the South
Vietnamese government. Indeed, one of the authors of the Pentagon Papers commented,
“For Diem, a clear-cut treaty probably seemed the best possible combination of
maximizing the American commitment while minimizing American leverage. And that,
of course, would help explain why the [Kennedy] Administration was not terribly
attracted to such a proposal.”226
Regardless, after Diem broached the topic of a defense treaty, Taylor was
dispatched to assist the president in gaining better insight into the situation and to assess
the viability of committing American combat forces to the fight. The addition of US
ground forces was something that Diem seemed to waiver on, debating whether they
would further commit the Americans to his cause or whether they—by their presence
would serve to undermine his nationalist credentials.227 Meanwhile, after his arrival in
country, Taylor sought to examine the different ways American capabilities could be
leverage to assist the GVN as well as assess the actual stability of the Diem regime and
its ability to defeat the insurgency with, or without, US support.228
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The Taylor mission also acted as a psychological counter to the setbacks the
global anti-communist effort had suffered in Laos. Lansdale, for one, reported that Nhu
believed the “the Asian man-in-the-street” was profoundly demoralized by the
compromise government installed in Vientiane. Nhu, Lansdale noted, saw the general’s
visit as a public display of American commitment to the South Vietnamese government, a
display that would improve the morale of the Vietnamese people.229
Taylor toured the country and met with key American and South Vietnamese
officials, and in a subsequent eyes-only memorandum to President Kennedy, commented
on the disunity of the American effort in Saigon. “Is there a need for better organization
at the Washington end?” he wrote. “At the present time State, Defense and CIA are
forwarding three separate reports to the White House. There is no agency short of the
President with the responsibility and authority to scrutinize the interdepartmental actions
taken and to direct corrective action when such is necessary.”230
Taylor also spoke with Thompson, and in the course of their interaction,
Thompson gave him a draft of what became his Delta Plan.231 Taylor brought the plan
back to Washington, where Roger Hilsman, the head of the State Department’s Bureau of
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Intelligence and Research, saw it.232 Hilsman was so taken by Thompson’s plan that he
copied many of its concepts into his “A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam,” which
was presented to an amenable Kennedy, who supported it.233
The American president, who was already reluctant to pressure Diem for reforms,
feared that withholding military and financial aid to the South Vietnamese government
would have a twofold, negative effect: first, the GVN might fall, much like the
Kuomintang government in China had during the Truman administration. Second, within
the context of the Laotian crisis, a failure to fund the Diem regime might give the
appearance to the Soviet Union and Southeast Asia that the United States was not
prepared to defend the region against communist expansion.234 Therefore, as compared
to conditional support discussed in the CIP, the Delta Plan—as presented in Hilsman’s
strategic concept paper—proved an opportunity to both encourage the Diem government
to assume the offensive and show the world that the United States was to hold the line
against communist expansion.
The Delta Plan and Hilsman’s concept paper also served to address American
concerns that were articulated by one of the State Department officials traveling with
Taylor in Vietnam. These concerns reflected hesitations in signing a defense treaty with
the Diem regime or sending US combat forces to fight the Viet Cong. In his report to
President Kennedy, Taylor had called for the introduction of American ground forces,
ostensibly to assist the South Vietnamese in recovery operations following recent
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flooding in the Mekong Delta.235 These forces, however, would have had the ability to
fight the Viet Cong in self-defense, a situation that would have provided both wide
latitude for engaging in combat operations and the potential to draw the Americans
deeper into the war.
In opposition to Taylor’s recommendation, the State Department official thought
the arrival of US combat forces would be counter-productive. “The Communist
operation starts from the lowest social level the villages. The battle must be joined and
won at this point. . . .Foreign military forces cannot themselves win the battle at the
village level,” wrote the official.236 Only GVN forces could defeat the insurgency in the
war for the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people, the official reasoned.
Therefore, while the US should assist the GVN in this fight, the Americans must avoid
“any treaty or pact which either shifts ultimate responsibility to the US or engages any
full US commitment to eliminate the Viet Cong threat.”237 The official concluded:
US responsibility without control would be disastrous. Although control over SVN
[South Vietnam] forces, as in Korea, might theoretically be possible, the Communist
attack on VN [Vietnam] is radically different from the attack on Korea. If this were a
situation in which the chances were good that application of US military force could
solve the problem, then responsibility and control might be desirable. But it is not, so
US control should not be sought.238
American internal debates over assuming a more direct role in combating the
communist insurgency, or in formalizing the United States’ relationship with the GVN in
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a treaty, reflected the continuing conflict within the Kennedy administration over the best
way forward in Southeast Asia. While no treaty was signed in 1961 or soldiers sent,
Diem was able to capitalize on American reticence for direct combat operations by
publically supporting Thompson’s Delta Plan. As Hilsman’s concept paper was, in many
ways, a copy of Thompson’s plan, the Briton’s ideas about the way forward against the
insurgency proved a compromise of sorts between the South Vietnamese government and
its American backers that both sides could—at least initially—support.
Americans’ indirect acceptance of the Delta Plan also displayed Diem and Nhu’s
ability to shape the destiny of their nation while managing the continued financial and
military support their regime required to survive. The Ngo brothers had been concerned
that the CIP would open the door to an ARVN coup, and they spent the majority of 1961
engaged in negotiations with the United States’ mission in Saigon as to whether
continued aid should be tied to South Vietnamese acceptance of the CIP, with its attached
demands for political and military reforms.
Thompson’s proposal proved the perfect expedient for the Ngos to escape
American demands for a restructuring of the ARVN chain of command and their calls for
the inclusion of political opponents into the GVN. Similarly, Thompson’s interactions
with Taylor showed that Thompson clearly knew how to work the American decisionmaking system. By gaining American presidential support for his plan—which was also
Diem’s preferred plan—Thompson presumably gained more influence with the GVN,
placing him in a better position to guide the course of the war, achieving the UK’s
purpose in sending him to Saigon.
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Thompson’s maneuver around the Americans in Saigon to influence their
superiors in Washington met with initial frustration from the United States mission in the
South Vietnamese capital. The American ambassador fired off an angry telegram in
November 1961 to his superiors, complaining that the “Thompson Mission is badly off
rails from standpoint US-UK coordination and that Thompson recommendations to GVN,
whatever may be their intrinsic merit, are bound to complicate our task of bringing about
essential reforms in GVN military and administrative structure.”239 Elsewhere in the
telegram, the ambassador noted with frustration that Thompson had submitted the Delta
Plan to Diem “without prior consultation with US and without real effort to ascertain
thrust of our plans or programs for counterinsurgency.”240
But only a few months later, tensions between BRIAM and the American mission
in Saigon appeared to have cooled. In February 1962, one official from the United States
Embassy reported, “Thompson has been in constant touch with us on this [rural
pacification efforts] and has meticulously coordinated his efforts with MAAG and the
Embassy. His recommendations closely parallel those we have been or would be making
to the GVN, and if accepted, they would be a major step forward for all concerned.”241
This rapprochement—perhaps driven by Thompson’s own diplomatic skill and charm,
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deriving in part from his time in England’s elite schools—seems to have lasted
throughout the remainder of the Strategic Hamlet Program.
Ultimately, Diem’s maneuverings forced the Americans to support him while
requiring little to no reform from the GVN, demonstrating Diem’s understanding of the
American political situation as well as the United States’ conception of South Vietnam as
a frontline within the global Cold War. Events proved that Diem did not hesitate to use
BRIAM to influence the Americans. Diem’s pursuit of the implementation of a South
Vietnamese-inspired counterinsurgency plan demonstrated, too, the existence of an
independent government in Saigon that was attempting to find Vietnamese solutions to
Vietnamese problems—which was General Abrams’s goal during the Vietnamization
period described as the “better war” by historian Lewis Sorely.
The Strategic Hamlet Program truly was a South Vietnamese program. The
American ambassador reported that, during a meeting between Taylor and Diem, Diem
alluded to a new strategic plan he intended to implement after Taylor repeatedly stressed
the importance of an overarching strategy that encompassed military, social, economic,
and political lines of effort.242 While Thompson, drawing from his experiences in
Malaya, introduced the subject of strategic hamlets in the Delta Plan, the program Diem
and Nhu championed built on pre-existing South Vietnamese efforts to secure and control
the rural population, particularly the agroville program.
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Indeed, within the recent memory of most South Vietnamese, the French had
pursued a strategy of consolidating parts of the rural population into secured villages and
hamlets during their failed campaign against the Viet Minh.243 This program proved a
model for the South Vietnamese government when it implemented the Rural Community
Development Centers Program in 1959.244 These rural centers were referred to as
agrovilles.245 The agrovilles established under this program typically consisted of 300500 families that had been relocated into centralized areas for the purpose of security,
population control, and the more efficient distribution of government services, such as
schools and clinics. However, the agrovilles were generally considered unsuccessful:
peasants were unhappy about their removal from ancestral homes, the distance they had
to travel to reach their fields, and the often-ineffective administrators assigned to oversee
government services.246 Diem recognized the Viet Cong were exploiting this discontent,
and in 1960, he adjusted the program to construct smaller agro-hamlets, consisting of
approximately 100 families and placed closer to village farmland.247 The Strategic
Hamlet Program built these agro-hamlets across the country, but “it was inevitable, given
this lineage, that [the program] be regarded by the peasants as old wine in newly-labeled
bottles.”248
The program’s nation-wide scale and the level of planning and organization
separated strategic hamlets from agrovilles and the sporadic construction of the agro-
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hamlets. In short, the Strategic Hamlet Program, after securing the support of the
Americans, “became the operational blueprint for ending the insurgency.”249 While the
earlier programs had supplemented ARVN operations, now ARVN operations were (in
theory) used to shape the establishment of strategic hamlets.
According to plan, a strategic hamlet was constructed over several phases, each
conducted with the intent of achieving a political solution to the communist insurgency.
First, ARVN forces cleared a designated area. Next, local villagers built defenses for
their respective hamlets, a process that might necessitate the relocation of families under
the rationale that consolidation made it easier for the government to administer services
and defend against Viet Cong attacks. Finally, the GVN established social services, often
building schools and clinics, to improve the social welfare of the rural population and win
their hearts and minds.250 Simultaneously, ARVN forces turned hamlet defense over to
the Civil Guard, a paramilitary unit that acted as a provincial response force, which then
transferred security responsibilities to locally recruited villagers enrolled in the SelfDefense Corps.251 At the national level, Diem established the Inter-Ministerial
Committee for Strategic Hamlets (IMCSH), which coordinated the heads of various
South Vietnamese ministries, ostensibly to guide the program’s direction. However, the
IMCSH answered to Nhu.252
Nhu saw the program as an opportunity to spread the ideology he believed was
the alternative to communism: Personalism. Explaining their purpose, Nhu stated:
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“Strategic hamlets seek to assure the security of the people in order that the success of the
political, social, and military revolution might be assured by the enthusiastic movement
of solidarity and self-sufficiency.”253 The Strategic Hamlet Program offered the perfect
conduit—by way of the provincial administration—through which the Diem regime
could spread this message.254
Measuring the effectiveness of each phase soon proved difficult. One author of
the Pentagon Papers noted that for the Vietnamese and their foreign advisors, success
proved a matter of perspective as all sides had different ideas as to what the program
should accomplish:
It is the problem of men with different perspectives each moulding [sic] his own
conception of a proper body to the same skeleton. If the final product were to have
some semblance of coherence and mutual satisfaction it was necessary that the shapers
came to agreement on substance and operational procedure, not just that they agree on
the proper skeleton upon which to work.255
While there was a general consensus that the program should happen, how it should
happen proved a point of contention, reflecting the overall incoherence and disconnect
present amongst the various foreign advisors and between the foreigners and the Diem
regime.
At the program’s start, American military advisors were concerned that it
subordinated military concerns to political ones, but they viewed the increased security
role of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps as an improvement that forced ARVN
forces into a more aggressive role. Even then, MAAG was concerned that the program’s
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intended deliberate pace, designed to methodically win the hearts and minds, would be
too slow to be effective.256
Meanwhile, American civilian personnel in Saigon and Washington tended to
favor the program’s emphasis on winning the people’s support as a political solution to
the conflict; they considered any communist gains a reflection of Diem’s lack of popular
support. Many American civilians in Saigon also saw any increase in GVN
administrative capabilities as another step towards the ability of the South Vietnamese to
conduct operations independent of American support.257
However, Diem and Nhu once again used the differences amongst the various
American attitudes to push their own agenda. An author of the Pentagon Papers noted
that in regard to expectations, “US groups differed in degree; Diem’s expectations
differed in kind.”258 It is important to remember that the Pentagon Papers were a study
compiled by Americans several years after the death of Diem but before the ultimate
withdrawal of the United States from the war. From this midway perspective, with
greater wisdom born of what had gone before, but without the knowledge of what was to
come, the study’s authors drew from secret American documents to determine that
Diem’s first priority, within the conditions set by the Laotian compromise, was
controlling the population. Winning the hearts and minds would come after. In
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discussions with Ambassador Nolting, Diem “stressed that any attempt to “broaden the
government” and to “make it more popular” was putting the cart before the horse.”259
The Strategic Hamlet Program presented an opportunity for Diem and Nhu to
accomplish a difficult task: secure American support without sacrificing Vietnamese
sovereignty. As the South Vietnamese government implemented the program, it satisfied
American civilians calling for Diem to take a more active role in defeating the
insurgency. At the same time, the program appeased American military advisors at
MAAG, who wanted the ARVN freed from static defensive positions to conduct
offensive operations against the Viet Cong.260 While there was often dissension within
the foreigners’ ranks in Saigon, and while there was substantial disagreement about the
course the Strategic Hamlet Program should take, it looked as if the majority of Diem’s
backers believed that the program was, to varying degrees, a possible solution to
Vietnam’s communist problem. Therefore, Diem and Nhu had a certain amount of
latitude to use the program for their own gains: namely, to strengthen their hold on South
Vietnam’s rural population, in part by spreading their ideology of Personalism.
Thus in early 1962, on the eve of Operation Sunrise—the first operation under the
new Strategic Hamlet Program—Diem and Nhu appeared to have found the perfect
solution to their situation: a counterinsurgency program that was driven by the
Vietnamese, approved by the Americans, promised a way to defeat the communists, and
provided a means through which the Ngo brothers could expand their control of the
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country. It seemed as if Diem had successfully played his foreign advisors against one
another and gotten what he wanted: funding for his own program to win the war and
improve support for his rule.
There was much debate within the advisory community with regard to where the
Strategic Hamlet Program should start. The American military preferred War Zone D, an
area immediately to the north of Saigon that was considered a Viet Cong stronghold.
Thompson wanted to start in the Delta region, or at least a portion of it, as it was where
the majority of the South Vietnamese population lived and was also the source of most of
its agricultural output. He maintained that the South Vietnamese government should
pursue an ink blot-type strategy; government control could extend from areas of
concentrated government presence. It was a slow, methodical process, perhaps too slow
for the American advisors, who tended to want more immediate results to gain the
initiative against the communists.261
The South Vietnamese, however, preferred Binh Duong, a province to the north
of Saigon that contained important Viet Cong communication and supply routes.262 By
advocating for Binh Duong, an area the Ngos considered strategically important and in
which they were already pursuing some pacification efforts, the GVN wished “to commit
the Americans to support of Diem’s government on terms which would be in fact
acceptable to that government and would—equally important—appear to be U.S. support
for GVN-initiated actions.”263 During discussions with the chief of MAAG, Diem drew
upon Thompson’s belief that a sweep through War Zone D, which spanned more than
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one province, would prove ineffective, potentially damaging ARVN’s morale.264
Ultimately, the South Vietnamese president’s argument proved persuasive, and the
Americans agreed to support Diem’s choice of Binh Duong as the starting point for the
Strategic Hamlet Program.265
Operation Sunrise began on March 1962 but ran into early difficulties.266 While
ARVN forces met little resistance, once the GVN began construction of the new
settlements, only seventy families out of 205 voluntarily relocated to the strategic hamlet.
The others were forcibly relocated, and previous settlements, regardless if the inhabitants
had moved willingly or not, were destroyed, in part to discourage families from leaving
the new strategic hamlets.267 A correspondent from The New York Times reported, “This
harsh, desperate measure was approved by the Americans because it worked so well for
the British in Malaya. There, the forced resettlement of a half-million people was the
turning point in the British defeat of the Communists.”268 However, as only 120 militaryaged males were found amongst the families, it seemed as if many of the others had
(willingly or not) joined the Viet Cong guerillas.269 Despite these inauspicious
beginnings, the program quickly expanded to a national level, and while resettlement
efforts continued in some areas, in others, existing hamlets and villages were fortified.270
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By the end of 1962, the Diem regime maintained that more than thirty-three percent of
the South Vietnamese population lived in strategic hamlets.271
As the program gained pace, and as more and more hamlets and villages were
fortified across the country, Americans worked to evaluate the effectiveness of the
program. Generally, evaluations focused on the construction aspect of the Strategic
Hamlet Program and not on the subsequent delivery of government services.272 Pro- and
anti-Diem American observers emphasized different statistics. Diem supporters within
the advisory community discussed numbers that portrayed an increase in the number of
hamlets constructed and a fall in the number of incidents initiated by the Viet Cong.273
Opponents, on the other hand, pointed to examples of farmers forced to construct new
settlements and any lapses in the Diem regime’s compensation to peasants for property
destroyed during the resettlement process.274
The principal concern of the foreigners in Saigon soon proved to be the speed at
which Nhu constructed new strategic hamlets. His rapidity resulted in especial concern
for Thompson, who saw it as a recipe for disaster. It was Nhu’s apparent abandonment of
the intended deliberate pace of hamlet construction that caused Thompson to eventually
disown the program. During a cocktail party at the American ambassador’s house in
Saigon, Nhu referred to Thompson as “the father of the programme.”275 Thompson,
upset that “the proliferation of strategic hamlets was being carried out to a point of
absurdity and was endangering the earlier more secure areas,” answered that he “did not
271
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recognize these children.”276 For his part, Nhu “distrusted [Thompson] as having the
outlook of a colonial administrator.”277
Several years later, Thompson looked back at the program’s execution and
concluded: “The major weakness in the Vietnamese implementation of the Strategic
Hamlet Programme was that it had no strategic direction, with the result that strategic
hamlets were created haphazardly all over the country, and in no area was there a really
solid block of them.”278 In his opinion, the strategic hamlets were too isolated from one
another to provide mutual support or create an area in which the insurgents would find
little to no assistance from the local inhabitants. Comparing the situation in South
Vietnam with the one he had experienced in Malaya, Thompson wrote, “It took over
three years to establish 500 defended Chinese villages in Malaya. In less than two years
in Vietnam over 8,000 strategic hamlets were created, the majority of them in the first
nine months of 1963. No attention was paid to their purpose; their creation became the
purpose in itself.”279
Meanwhile, the United States continued to provide support for the program.
However, while many American officials agreed with it in principal, some also began to
question its direction. One author of the Pentagon Papers commented that to the
Americans, “As brother Nhu visibly took the reins controlling the program and began to
solidify control over the Youth Corps [a Can Lao-affiliated group used to spread
Personalism] it became increasingly clear that Diem was emphasizing government
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control of the peasantry at the expense (at least in US eyes) of pacification.”280 While the
number of Vietnamese living in strategic hamlets increased, the actual effectiveness of
the program, and whether the Diem regime was sacrificing quantity for quality, was a
matter of perspective and debate.281
That the effectiveness of the Strategic Hamlet Program depended on the
perspective of the viewer demonstrates the difficulty in determining whether or not it was
successful at winning the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people. However,
the program’s creation was a rare moment of agreement between the various advisors and
the Diem regime, and it was a moment created by Thompson and exploited by Diem.
BRIAM and Thompson’s presence in Saigon, and their initiative in pushing the Delta
Plan through Taylor to Kennedy, created an opportunity for Diem to gain American
support for a counterinsurgency plan that had (from his perspective) the primary
objective of solidifying his control of the countryside.
Although the Strategic Hamlet Program resembled Thompson’s Delta Plan, it
differed in size and scope. BRIAM’s plan was contained to the Delta, an area that—once
secured—would be a jump-off point for future pacification efforts, but Nhu quickly
transformed the program into a nationwide operation. Perhaps most crucially, whereas
the Delta Plan was concerned with securing the population in order to deliver social
services and win hearts and minds, Diem and Nhu concentrated on controlling the
population by moving them into strategic hamlets. Controlling and securing the
population involved the same resettlement tactics but with different intents. Thompson
280
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wanted to win support through a demonstration of government services. Nhu wanted to
indoctrinate his citizens through state programs with the design of inculcating the tenets
of Personalism into the nation.
Ultimately, the Strategic Hamlet Program ended with the Ngo brothers’ death in
November 1963.282 While it had continued to expand throughout 1962 and 1963, the
program—and Nhu’s indoctrination efforts—coincided with other political crises,
particularly the growing agitation within South Vietnam’s large Buddhist population.
That crisis would prove the Ngos’ downfall.
While Diem and Nhu responded to the Buddhists’ protests with increasingly
autocratic measures, President Kennedy, influenced by several key civilian officials in his
administration, reflecting the continued existence of several factions within the American
mission, supported the ARVN coup in November 1963. Diem and Nhu were killed in the
process, murdered by an ARVN officer in the back of an armored personnel carrier.
Possibly the greatest critique of the Strategic Hamlet Program is that many
hamlets were abandoned after the Ngo brothers were killed.283 However, it would not be
the last time that the Americans would support efforts to win hearts and minds. In the
last years of the United States’ involvement, General Abrams would encourage similar
GVN programs to win the villages and hamlets scattered across South Vietnam.284
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION
In A Better War, Lewis Sorley discussed the changes General Abrams made to the
American war effort from 1969-1973. Sorley maintained that Abrams’s policy of one
war and Vietnamization turned the United States’ effort around, and if the Americans had
pursued similar policies during the Westmoreland era, Sorley argued, then America
might have been more successful in the Vietnam War.
However, Sorley ignored the earlier efforts the Americans and British made
during the Diem regime. Rather than being an American puppet, Diem and his brother
Nhu were Vietnamese nationalists who tried to juggle their sovereign ambitions with
their need for financial and military support from the United States. The conflicting
priorities of the United States’ mission made this more difficult. American advisors,
diplomats, intelligence officers, and politicians in Washington and Saigon generally
shared the same goal of maintaining a pro-west South Vietnam, but each group had
different opinions as to how that should be accomplished.
These fissures and disputes would ultimately contribute to the coup that cost
Diem and Nhu their lives. But even before that fateful day in November 1963,
disagreements between different advisors often prevented the establishment of a
generally agreed upon policy for success in Vietnam. Robert Thompson and BRIAM
filled that void. Invited by Diem after diplomatic maneuvering by the United Kingdom,
the South Vietnamese president saw the British presence as a potential counterweight to
American influence. Similarly, Thompson arrived with the notion that the Americans did
not have the right expertise to defeat the communists in Vietnam. He, on the other hand,
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believed he had valuable experience gained from the Malayan Emergency that could
provide special insight that might bring victory in Southeast Asia.
Thompson’s Delta Plan, therefore, was the perfect opportunity for Diem to show
his American backers that he was willing to follow foreign advice while still maintaining
his sovereignty. The Delta Plan was, to a certain extent, a bigger and more organized
version of earlier French and South Vietnamese programs. That these programs had not
been successful seems not to have dissuaded the Americans, British, and the Diem
regime from trying them again. Rather, they became an opportunity for the Diem regime
to attempt to strengthen its hold on the country.
At the same time, Thompson’s Delta Plan, which the South Vietnamese were
already executing to a certain degree, was reflected in Abrams’s policy of
Vietnamization. Indeed, the counterinsurgency strategies of the Ngos, Thompson, and
Abrams all emphasized Vietnamese-led efforts to win hearts and minds at the village and
hamlet level. Like Diem, Thompson, and several of their American contemporaries,
Abrams saw any primarily military solution to the insurgency as treating the symptoms,
rather than the cause, of the insurgency. Only by winning the people of South Vietnam to
the cause of the government in Saigon could the GVN and its American backers be
victorious, Abrams realized—mirroring the policy pursued several years before during
the advisory period. Ultimately, Thompson’s plan was both an early version of Abrams’s
better war and an opportunity for Diem to pursue his own counterinsurgency plan while
maintaining American fiscal and military support for his regime. BRIAM’s presence in
Saigon added another player to the South Vietnamese political milieu, one that Diem was
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able to manipulate in his efforts to walk the razor’s edge that separated a stable
government from a successful coup on the Cold War’s frontline.
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